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Snyder v. Phelps
09-751
Ruling Below: Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 2010 U.S. LEXIS
2280 (2010).
Appellants, members of the Westboro Baptist Church, picketed at the funeral for Snyder's son as
a way to gain media attention for appellants' anti-homosexual message. Snyder filed suit against
the protestors alleging various state law tort claims and a jury found in Snyder's favor. The
appellants argued that the trial court's judgment against them contravened the right to free
speech guaranteed by the First Amendment. The appellate court agreed, holding that (1) although
appellants' picket signs, which conveyed messages such as "America is Doomed," "Fag
Troops," and "Thank God for Dead Soldiers," were utterly distasteful, they involved matters of
public concern, including the issue of homosexuals in the military and the moral conduct of the
U.S. and its citizens; (2) no reasonable reader could interpret any of these signs as asserting
actual and objectively verifiable facts about the father or his son; (3) the statements were
protected by the First Amendment because they asserted non-provable facts and clearly
contained imaginative and hyperbolic rhetoric intended to spark debate about issues that
concerned appellants; and (4) an "epic" that appellants posted about the family on the church's
website, which was aimed at Catholics, was also protected because it was patterned after the
hyperbolic and figurative language used on the picket signs.
Questions Presented: (1) Does Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell apply to a private person
versus another private person concerning a private matter? (2) Does the First Amendment's
freedom of speech tenet trump the First Amendment's freedom of religion and peaceful
assembly? (3) Does an individual attending a family member's funeral constitute a captive
audience who is entitled to state protection from unwanted communication?
Albert SNYDER, Plaintiff-Appellee,
V.
Fred W. PHELPS, Sr.; Westboro Baptist Church, Incorporated; Rebekah A. Phelps-Davis;
Shirley L. Phelps-Roper, Defendants-Appellants.
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Decided September 24, 2009
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.]
KING, Circuit Judge: its members (collectively, the
In June 2006, Albert Snyder instituted this "Defendants"). Snyder's lawsuit is
diversity action in the District of Maryland predicated on two related events: a protest
against Westboro Baptist Church, the Defendants conducted in Maryland near
Incorporated (the "Church"), and several of the funeral of Snyder's son Matthew (an
enlisted Marine who tragically died in Iraq
in March 2006), and a self-styled written
"epic" (the "Epic") that the Defendants
posted on the Internet several weeks after
Matthew's funeral. Snyder's complaint
alleged five state law tort claims, three of
which are implicated in this appeal: invasion
of privacy by intrusion upon seclusion,
intentional infliction of emotional distress
("lIED"), and civil conspiracy. After a trial
in October 2007, the jury found the
Defendants liable for $ 2.9 million in
compensatory damages and a total of $ 8
million in punitive damages. Although the
district court remitted the aggregate punitive
award to $ 2.1 million, it otherwise denied
the post-trial motions. See Snyder v. Phelps,
533 F. Supp. 2d 567 (D. Md. 2008) (the
"Post-Trial Opinion"). The Defendants have
appealed, contending that the judgment
contravenes the First Amendment of the
Constitution. As explained below, we
reverse on that basis.
A.
The facts of this case as presented at trial are
largely undisputed, and they are detailed in
the district court's Post-Trial Opinion:
On March 3, 2006, Marine Lance
Corporal Matthew A. Snyder was
killed in Iraq in the line of duty.
Shortly thereafter, two United States
Marines came to the home of the
Plaintiff, Albert Snyder, and told him
that his son had died. . . . Obituary
notices were placed in local
newspapers providing notice of the
time and location of the funeral.
Defendant Fred W. Phelps, Sr.,
founded Defendant Westboro Baptist
Church, Inc. in Topeka, Kansas, in
1955. For fifty-two years, he has
been the only pastor of the church,
which has approximately sixty or
seventy members, fifty of whom are
his children, grandchildren, or in-
laws. Among these family members
are Defendants Shirley L. Phelps-
Roper and Rebekah A. Phelps-Davis.
. . . [T]he members of this church
practice a "fire and brimstone"
fundamentalist religious faith.
Among their religious beliefs is that
God hates homosexuality and hates
and punishes America for its
tolerance of homosexuality,
particularly in the United States
military. Members of the church
have increasingly picketed funerals
to assert these beliefs. Defendants
have also established a website
identified as www.godhatesfags.com
in order to publicize their religious
viewpoint.
Phelps testified that members of the
Westboro Baptist Church learned of
Lance Cpl. Snyder's funeral and
issued a news release on March 8,
2006, announcing that members of
the Phelps family intended to come
to Westminster, Maryland, and
picket the funeral. On March 10,
2006, Phelps, his daughters Phelps-
Roper and Phelps-Davis, and four of
his grandchildren arrived in
Westminster, Maryland, to picket
Matthew Snyder's funeral. None of
the Defendants ever met any
members of the Snyder family.
... [Defendants] carried signs which
expressed general messages such as
"God Hates the USA," "'America is
doomed," "Pope in hell," and "Fag
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troops." The signs also carried more
specific messages, to wit: "You're
going to hell," "God hates you,"
"Semper fi fags," and "Thank God
for dead soldiers." Phelps testified
that it was Defendants' "duty" to
deliver the message "whether they
want to hear it or not." Lance Cpl.
Snyder's funeral was thus utilized by
Defendants as the vehicle for this
message.
It was undisputed at trial that
Defendants complied with local
ordinances and police directions with
respect to being a certain distance
from the church. Furthermore, it was
established at trial that Snyder did
not actually see the signs until he
saw a television program later that
day with footage of the Phelps
family at his son's funeral.
Defendants' utilization of Matthew
Snyder's funeral to publicize their
message continued after the actual
funeral on March 10, 2006. After
returning to Kansas, Phelps-Roper
published an "epic" on the church's
website, www.godhatesfags.com. In
"The Burden of Marine Lance Cpl.
Matthew Snyder," Phelps-Roper
stated that Albert Snyder and his ex-
wife "taught Matthew to defy his
creator," "raised him for the devil,"
and "taught him that God was a liar."
In the aftermath of his son's funeral,
Snyder learned that there was
reference to his son on the Internet
after running a search on Google.
Through the use of that search
engine, he read Phelps-Roper's
"epic" on the church's website.
Snyder v. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 2d 567, 571-
72 (D. Md. 2008).
A.
It is well established that tort liability under
state law, even in the context of litigation
between private parties, is circumscribed by
the First Amendment. See New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 264-65
(1964). Although the Supreme Court in New
York Times specifically addressed the
common law tort of defamation, the Court
explained that its reasoning did not turn on
the precise "form in which state power has
been applied." Accordingly, the Court later
applied the First Amendment to other torts
not involving reputational damages, and we
have applied the Court's controlling
principles to other state law torts. Thus,
regardless of the specific tort being
employed, the First Amendment applies
when a plaintiff seeks damages for
reputational, mental, or emotional injury
allegedly resulting from the defendant's
speech.
Where, as here, the First Amendment is
implicated by the assertion of tort claims
arising from speech, we have the obligation
"to 'make an independent examination of
the whole record' in order to make sure that
'the judgment does not constitute a
forbidden intrusion on the field of free
expression."' We review de novo a district
court's conclusions of law with respect to a
First Amendment issue.
In its New York Times decision, the Supreme
Court established a rule barring public
officials from recovering damages for the
common law tort of defamation unless the
allegedly defamatory statement was made
with "actual malice," and the Court defined
such malice as knowing falsity or reckless
disregard for the truth. The Court later
expanded that constitutional standard to
speech concerning "public figures" as well
as "public officials."
Nevertheless, in a distinct but related line of
decisions, the Court has recognized that
there are constitutional limits on the type of
speech to which state tort liability may
attach. Thus, although there is no categorical
constitutional defense for statements of
"opinion," the First Amendment will fully
protect "statements that cannot 'reasonably
[be] interpreted as stating actual facts' about
an individual."
In Milkovich, which is a crucial precedent in
our disposition of this appeal, the Supreme
Court declined to adopt an artificial
dichotomy between "opinion" and "fact,"
and it specifically eschewed the multifactor
tests that several lower courts (including this
Court) had utilized to categorize speech. See
497 U.S. at 19. In Milkovich, the Court
assessed whether a newspaper enjoyed First
Amendment protection for a column that
referred to a wrestling coach as a "liar,"
based on his allegedly deceitful testimony
before a state athletics council. The
newspaper maintained that the column
merely stated its author's opinion, and was
thus subject to categorical First Amendment
protection. The Court rejected this
contention, ruling instead that the
"dispositive question" was "whether a
reasonable fact-finder could conclude that
the statements in the [newspaper] column
imply an assertion that [the coach] perjured
himself in a judicial proceeding."
Concluding that the column's assertions
were "susceptible of being proved true or
false," the Court determined that they were
not protected by the First Amendment.
In light of Milkovich, and as carefully
explained by Judge Motz in our Biospherics
decision, we are obliged to assess how an
objective, reasonable reader would
understand a challenged statement by
focusing on the plain language of the
statement and the context and general tenor
of its message. See Biospherics, 151 F.3d at
184. And we must emphasize the
"verifiability of the statement," because a
statement not subject to objective
verification is not likely to assert actual
facts.
There are two subcategories of speech that
cannot reasonably be interpreted as stating
actual facts about an individual, and that
thus constitute speech that is constitutionally
protected. First, the First Amendment serves
to protect statements on matters of public
concern that fail to contain a "provably false
factual connotation." We assess as a matter
of law whether challenged speech involves a
matter of public concern by examining the
content, form, and context of such speech, as
revealed by the whole record. "Speech
involves a matter of public concern when it
involves an issue of social, political, or other
interest to a community." In order to be
treated as speech involving a matter of
public concern, the interested community
need not be especially large nor the relevant
concern of "paramount importance or
national scope."
Second, rhetorical statements employing
"loose, figurative, or hyperbolic language"
are entitled to First Amendment protection
to ensure that "public debate will not suffer
for lack of 'imaginative expression' or the
'rhetorical hyperbole' which has
traditionally added much to the discourse of
our Nation." The general tenor of rhetorical
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speech, as well as the use of "loose,
figurative, or hyperbolic language"
sufficiently negates any impression that the
speaker is asserting actual facts. We assess
as a matter of law whether speech contains
rhetorical hyperbole protected by the First
Amendment.
B.
In this proceeding, Snyder was awarded
judgment against the Defendants on three of
the tort claims asserted in the Amended
Complaint: intrusion upon seclusion, IIED,
and civil conspiracy. By these claims,
Snyder sought damages for injuries to his
state of mind only, and not for pecuniary
loss. Thus, the verdict in favor of Snyder can
only be sustained if it is consistent with the
Defendants' First Amendment guarantees.
As explained below, the Defendants
correctly contend that the district court erred
in permitting the jury to decide legal issues
reserved to the court, and then by denying
the Defendants' request for judgment as a
matter of law.
1.
Assuming that the district court otherwise
applied the proper legal standards to its
analysis of the Defendants' First
Amendment contentions, it fatally erred by
allowing the jury to decide relevant legal
issues. ...
The district court ... decided that it was for
the jury-not the court-to assess the
preliminary issue of the nature of the speech
involved, and to then decide whether such
speech was protected by the Free Speech
Clause. Thus, the jury was erroneously
tasked with deciding whether the
Defendants' speech was "directed
specifically at the Snyder family," and, if so,
whether it was so "offensive and shocking
as to not be entitled to First Amendment
protection." At the least, therefore, the
judgment must be vacated and a new trial
awarded, in that Instruction No. 21
authorized the jury to determine a purely
legal issue, namely, the scope of protection
afforded to speech under the First
Amendment.
As previously noted, however, a new trial is
unnecessary if the Defendants can prevail as
a matter of law after our independent
examination of the whole record. We are
thus obliged to apply the applicable legal
framework to the Defendants' various
protest signs and written Epic, and decide if
the Defendants are entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.
2.
The district court also erred when it utilized
an incorrect legal standard in its Post-Trial
Opinion. In assessing the Defendants' First
Amendment contentions, the court focused
almost exclusively on the Supreme Court's
opinion in Gertz, which it read to limit the
First Amendment's protections for "speech
directed by private individuals against other
private individuals." The court therefore
assessed whether Snyder was a "public
figure" under Gertz and whether Matthew's
funeral was a "public event."
The Supreme Court has created a separate
line of First Amendment precedent that is
specifically concerned with the
constitutional protections afforded to certain
types of speech, and that does not depend
upon the public or private status of the
speech's target. Thus, even if the district
court (as opposed to the jury) concluded that
Snyder and his son were not "public
figures," such a conclusion alone did not
dispose of the Defendants' First Amendment
contentions. In focusing solely on the status
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of the Snyders and the funeral, and not on
the legal issue concerning the nature of the
speech at issue, the court failed to assess
whether the pertinent statements could
reasonably be interpreted as asserting
"actual facts" about an individual, or
whether they instead merely contained
rhetorical hyperbole. Whether a statement
can reasonably be interpreted as stating
actual facts about an individual is a question
of law for the court and the district court
failed to consider that issue in its Post-Trial
Opinion. Consequently, we must assess the
content of the Defendants' protest signs as
well as the Epic, and determine whether
such speech is entitled to constitutional
protection.
a.
The following signs displayed by the
Defendants, which are similar in both their
message and syntax, can readily be assessed
together: "America is Doomed," "God Hates
the USA/Thank God for 9/11," "Pope in
Hell, .... Fag Troops," "Semper Fi Fags,"
"Thank God for Dead Soldiers," "Don't
Pray for the USA," "Thank God for IEDs,"
"Priests Rape Boys," and "God Hates Fags."
As a threshold matter, as utterly distasteful
as these signs are, they involve matters of
public concern, including the issue of
homosexuals in the military, the sex-abuse
scandal within the Catholic Church, and the
political and moral conduct of the United
States and its citizens. Such issues are not
subjects of "purely private concern," but
rather are issues of social, political, or other
interest to the community. As explained in
one of the amicus submissions, for example,
a public firestorm erupted in 2001 after two
prominent religious figures, Jerry Falwell
and Pat Robertson, alleged that the
September 11 th terrorist attacks represented
God's punishment for our country's
attitudes regarding homosexuality and
abortion.
Additionally, no reasonable reader could
interpret any of these signs as asserting
actual and objectively verifiable facts about
Snyder or his son. The signs reading "God
Hates the USA/Thank God for 9/11" and
"Don't Pray for the USA," for example, are
not concerned with any individual, but
rather with the nation as a whole. Other
signs (those referring to "fags," "troops,"
and "dead soldiers") use the plural form,
which would lead a reasonable reader to
conclude that the speaker is referring to a
group rather than an individual. Additional
signs are concerned with individuals, such
as the Pope, who are entirely distinct from
Snyder and his son, or with groups, such as
priests, to which neither Snyder nor his son
belong. Finally, those signs stating "Thank
God for Dead Soldiers" and "Thank God for
IEDs" only constitute a reference to
Snyder's son if the reader makes the
assumption that their only object is Matthew
Snyder and not the thousands of other
soldiers who have died in Iraq and
Afghanistan, often as a result of IEDs.
Even if the language of these signs could
reasonably be read to imply an assertion
about Snyder or his son, the statements are
protected by the Constitution for two
additional reasons: they do not assert
provable facts about an individual, and they
clearly contain imaginative and hyperbolic
rhetoric intended to spark debate about
issues with which the Defendants are
concerned. Whether "God hates" the United
States or a particular group or whether
America is "doomed," are matters of purely
subjective opinion that cannot be put to
objective verification. The statement "Thank
God," whether taken as an imperative phrase
or an exclamatory expression, is similarly
incapable of objective verification. And, as
heretofore explained, a reasonable reader
would not interpret the signs that could be
perceived as including verifiable facts, such
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as "Fag Troops" and "Priests Rape Boys," as
asserting actual facts about Snyder or his
son. To the contrary, these latter statements,
as well as others in this category, consist of
offensive and hyperbolic rhetoric designed
to spark controversy and debate. By
employing God, the strong verb "hate," and
graphic references to terrorist attacks, the
Defendants used the sort of "loose,
figurative, or hyperbolic language" that
seriously negates any impression that the
speaker is asserting actual facts about an
individual. Accordingly, we are constrained
to agree that these signs--"America is
Doomed," "God Hates the USA/Thank God
for 9/11," "Pope in Hell," "Fag Troops,"
"Semper Fi Fags," "Thank God for Dead
Soldiers," "Don't Pray for the USA,"
"Thank God for IEDs," "Priests Rape
Boys," and "God Hates Fags"-are entitled
to First Amendment protection.
b.
The reasonable reader's reaction to two
other signs-"You're Going to Hell" and
"God Hates You"-also must be specifically
addressed, as these two signs present a
closer question. We must conclude,
however, that these two signs cannot
reasonably be interpreted as stating actual
facts about any individual. The meaning of
these signs is ambiguous because the
pronoun "you" can be used to indicate either
the second person singular or plural form. A
reasonable reader could interpret these signs,
therefore, as referring to Snyder or his son
only, or, on the other hand, to a collective
audience (or even the nation as a whole).
We need not resolve this question of usage,
however, because a reasonable reader would
not interpret the statements on these two
signs as asserting actual and provable facts.
Whether an individual is "Going to Hell" or
whether God approves of someone's
character could not possibly be subject to
objective verification. Thus, even if the
reasonable reader understood the "you" in
these signs to refer to Snyder or his son, no
such reader would understand those
statements ("You're Going to Hell" and
"God Hates You") to assert provable facts
about either of them.
Additionally, as with the other signs, both of
these signs contain strong elements of
rhetorical hyperbole and figurative
expression. As we have recognized, the
"context and tenor" of the speech at issue, as
well as the speaker's use of "irreverent and
indefinite language," can serve to negate any
impression that he is asserting actual facts
about an individual. The general context of
the speech in this proceeding is one of
impassioned (and highly offensive) protest,
with the speech at issue conveyed on hand-
held placards. A distasteful protest sign
regarding hotly debated matters of public
concern, such as homosexuality or religion,
is not the medium through which a
reasonable reader would expect a speaker to
communicate objectively verifiable facts. In
addition, the words on these signs were
rude, figurative, and incapable of being
objectively proven or disproven. Given the
context and tenor of these two signs, a
reasonable reader would not interpret them
as asserting actual facts about either Snyder
or his son.
C.
Finally, the written Epic published on the
website of the Church is also protected by
the First Amendment, in that a reasonable
reader would understand it to contain
rhetorical hyperbole, and not actual,
provable facts about Snyder and his son. The
First Amendment issue concerning the Epic
presents a somewhat more difficult question,
however, because it is entitled "The Burden
of Marine Lance Cpl. Matthew A. Snyder."
Such a title could lead a reasonable reader to
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initially conclude that the Epic asserts facts
about this particular soldier. The Epic's
subtitle, however, immediately connects its
contents to the Defendants' protest and the
various signs displayed there: "The Visit of
Westboro Baptist Church to Help the
Inhabitants of Maryland Connect the Dots!
This Epic Adventure Took Place on Friday,
March 10, 2006." The Epic has a
photograph of the funeral protest
immediately below its title, followed by
nearly two pages of verbatim Bible verses.
The Epic then discusses Matthew's life:
"Twenty years ago, little Matthew Snyder
came into the world. . . . God created him
and loaned/entrusted him to Albert and Julie
Snyder." The Epic states that the Snyders
"had a DUTY to prepare that child to serve
the LORD his GOD-PERIOD! You did
JUST THE OPPOSITE-you raised him for
the devil. You taught him that God was a
liar." The Epic also focuses on Matthew's
upbringing, asserting that "Albert and Julie.
. . taught Matthew to defy his Creator, to
divorce, and to commit adultery. They
taught him how to support the largest
pedophile machine in the history of the
entire world, the Roman Catholic
monstrosity. . . . They also, in supporting
satanic Catholicism, taught Matthew to be
an idolater." After interspersing additional
excerpts from the Bible, the Epic refers to
Matthew's service in the military, noting
that he fought for
the United States of Sodom, a filthy
country that is in lock step with his
evil, wicked[,] and sinful manner of
life, putting him in the cross hairs of
a God that is so mad He has smoke
coming from his nostrils and fire
from his mouth! How dumb was
that?
Id. The Epic then links Matthew's death to
the Defendants' protest activities, stating:
God rose up Matthew for the very
purpose of striking him down, so that
God's name might be declared
throughout all the earth. He killed
Matthew so that His servants would
have an opportunity to preach His
words to the U.S. Naval Academy at
Annapolis, the Maryland Legislature,
and the whorehouse called St. John
Catholic Church at Westminster
where Matthew Snyder fulfilled his
calling.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Epic
cannot be divorced from the general context
of the funeral protest. Indeed, it is patterned
after the hyperbolic and figurative language
used on the various signs. Again, in
assessing the First Amendment issue, we
must evaluate a reasonable reader's reaction
to the Epic, in light of its context and
general tenor. In context, the Epic is a recap
of the protest and was distributed through
the Church website, which would not lead
the reasonable reader to expect actual facts
about Snyder or his son to be asserted
therein.
The general tenor of the Epic also serves to
negate any impression that it was the source
of any actual facts. In preparing it, the
Defendants interspersed strong, figurative
language with verses from the Bible. They
utilized distasteful and offensive words,
atypical capitalization, and exaggerated
punctuation, all of which suggest the work
of a hysterical protestor rather than an
objective reporter of facts. Despite referring
to the Snyder family by name, the Epic is
primarily concerned with the Defendants'
strongly held views on matters of public
concern. Indeed, the Epic explains that
Matthew's death in Iraq gave the Defendants
the "opportunity to preach [God's] words to
the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis [and]
the Maryland Legislature," where they
protested on the very day of Matthew's
funeral. Finally, the Defendants' extensive
funeral picketing activities predated
Matthew's funeral and continue to this day
throughout the country, with many of the
signs displayed at Matthew's funeral also
being displayed in other protests.
Thus, even when the Snyders are mentioned
in the Epic, a reasonable reader would
understand its contents to be primarily
focused on the more general message to
which their protests are directed. The
Defendants assert in the Epic, for example,
that the Snyders had incurred God's wrath
by raising Matthew as a Catholic and
allowing him to serve in the military-
assertions a reasonable reader would take as
focused on the Defendants' concerns with
the policies and activities of the Roman
Catholic Church and the military.
Furthermore, a reasonable reader would take
as rhetorically hyperbolic a text describing
the "United States of Sodom" as a "filthy"
country, labelling the Catholic Church as a
"pedophile machine," and equating the
Maryland Legislature with the Taliban. In
that context, the reasonable reader would
understand the other assertions of the Epic-
that the Snyders raised their son "for the
devil," and taught him to "defy his Creator,
to divorce, and to commit adultery"-as
simply "loose, figurative, or hyperbolic
language" not connoting actual facts about
Matthew or his parents. Thus, a reasonable
reader would not understand the Epic to
assert actual facts about either Snyder or his
son.
C.
Notwithstanding the distasteful and
repugnant nature of the words being
challenged in these proceedings, we are
constrained to conclude that the Defendants'
signs and Epic are constitutionally protected.
To paraphrase our distinguished colleague
Judge Hall, judges defending the
Constitution "must sometimes share [their]
foxhole with scoundrels of every sort, but to
abandon the post because of the poor
company is to sell freedom cheaply. It is a
fair summary of history to say that the
safeguards of liberty have often been forged
in controversies involving not very nice
people." Kopf v. Skyrm, 993 F.2d 374, 380
(4th Cir. 1993).
Nonetheless, the various states and
localities, as well as grieving families, may
yet protect the sanctity of solemn occasions
such as funerals and memorials. Indeed,
governmental bodies are entitled to place
reasonable and content-neutral time, place,
and manner restrictions on activities that are
otherwise constitutionally protected. Some
"breathing space" for contentious speech is
essential, however, under the Free Speech
Clause. As the Court long ago emphasized:
To persuade others to his own point
of view, the pleader, as we know, at
times, resorts to exaggeration, to
vilification of men who have been,
or are, prominent in church or state,
and even to false statement. But the
people of this nation have ordained
in the light of history, that, in spite of
the probability of excesses and
abuses, these liberties are, in the long
view, essential to enlightened
opinion and right conduct on the part
of citizens of a democracy.
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310,
(1940). Because the judgment attaches tort
liability to constitutionally protected speech,
the district court erred in declining to award
judgment as a matter of law.
IV.
Pursuant to the foregoing, the judgment of
the district court is reversed and the various
appeal bonds are hereby discharged.
JUDGMENT REVERSED AND BONDS
DISCHARGED.
CONCURRENCE
SHEDD, Circuit Judge, concurring in the
judgment:
Although I agree with the majority that the
judgment below must be reversed, I would
do so on different grounds. As I explain
below, I would hold that Snyder failed to
prove at trial sufficient evidence to support
the jury verdict on any of his tort claims.
Because the appeal can be decided on this
nonconstitutional basis, I would not reach
the First Amendment issue addressed by the
majority.
"Court to Rule on Funeral Pickets"
SCOTUSblog
March 8, 2010
Lyle Denniston
The Supreme Court, taking on the
emotionally charged issue of picketing
protests at the funerals of soldiers killed in
wartime, agreed Monday to consider
reinstating a $5 million damages verdict
against a Kansas preacher and his anti-gay
crusade. This was one of three newly
granted cases. The others test the
constitutionality of background checks for
workers who work for the government under
contract, rather than as regular employees,
and a case testing the right to sue in state
court when a child is injured or dies after
receiving a vaccine. All of the cases will
come up for review in the Court's next
Term, opening Oct. 4.
The funeral picketing case (Snyder v.
Phelps, et al., 09-751) focuses on a
significant question of First Amendment
law: the degree of constitutional protection
given to remarks that a private person made
about another private person, occurring
outside the site of a private event. The
family of the dead soldier had won a verdict
before a jury, but that was overturned by the
Fourth Circuit Court, finding that the signs
displayed at the funeral in western Maryland
and later comments on an anti-gay website
were protected speech. The petition for
review seeks the Court's protection for
families attending a funeral from
"unwanted" remarks or displays by
protesters.
In March four years ago, Marine Lance
Corporal Matthew A. Snyder was killed
while serving in Iraq. His family arranged
for a private funeral, with Christian burial, at
St. John's Catholic Church in Westminster,
Md. When word of the planned funeral
appeared in the newspapers, the Rev. Fred
W. Phelps, Sr., pastor of Westboro Baptist
Church in Topeka, Kan., who has gained
notoriety in recent years by staging protests
at military funerals, decided to stage a
demonstration at the Maryland funeral. In
response to such protests, some 40 states
have passed laws to regulate funeral
demonstrations.
The Rev. Phelps' church preaches a strongly
anti-gay message, contending that God hates
America because it tolerates homosexuality,
particularly in the military services. The
church also spreads its views through an
online site, www.godhatesfags.com. When
the Snyder funeral occurred, the Rev.
Phelps, two of his daughters and four
grandchildren staged a protest nearby. They
carried signs with such messages as "God
Hates the USA," ''America is doomed,"
"Pope in hell," "Semper fi fags," and
"Thank God for dead soldiers." The
demonstration violated no local laws, and
was kept at police orders a distance from the
church. After the funeral, the Rev. Phelps
continued his protest over the Snyder funeral
on his church's website, accusing the Snyder
family of having taught their son irreligious
beliefs.
The soldier's father, Albert Snyder, sued the
Rev. Phelps, his daughters and the Westboro
Church under Maryland state law, and won a
$5 million verdict based on three claims:
intrusion into a secluded event, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, and civil
conspiracy. (The verdict included $2.9
million for compensatory damages and $2.1
million for punitive damages; the punitive
award had been reduced from $8 million by
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the trial judge.) The Fourth Circuit Court
overturned the verdict, concluding that the
protesters' speech was protected by the First
Amendment because it was only a form of
hyperbole, not an assertion of actual facts
about the soldier or his family. While
finding that the Phelps' remarks were
"utterly distasteful," the Circuit Court said
they involved matters of public concern,
including the issue of homosexuality in the
military and the political and moral conduct
of the United States and its citizens.
In Albert Snyder's appeal, his lawyers
argued that the Supreme Court's protection
of speech about public issues, especially the
Justices' 1988 decision in Hustler Magazine
v. Falwell, does not apply "to private
individuals versus private individuals." If it
does apply, the petition said, "the victimized
private individual is left without recourse."
The Circuit Court decision, it added,
encourages private individuals to use
hyperbolic language to gain constitutional
protection "even if that language is targeted
at another private individual at a private,
religious funeral."
Even if the Hustler decision does apply to
the kind of remarks at issue, the petition
asserted, the case also raises the issue of
whether those who attend a funeral are like a
"captive audience" and thus need protection
against intruders who were not invited.
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"At Carroll Funeral, a National Protest"
The Baltimore Sub
March 11, 2006
Gina Davis
The family of Lance Cpl. Matthew A.
Snyder, who was killed last week in Iraq,
desperately wanted to keep his death from
being politicized.
But a group of protesters had other plans.
Waving placards declaring such messages as
"Thank God for dead soldiers," seven
members of the Westboro Baptist Church
from Topeka, Kan., picketed Snyder's
service yesterday as they have military
funerals across the nation.
Assembled on city property adjacent to the
St. John Catholic Church in Westminster,
the group held signs, some bearing anti-gay
slurs, that declared that war casualties are
divine retribution-that God is allowing
men and women to die in Iraq because of
this country's tolerance of homosexuality.
"We're here because we need to help these
families connect the dots," said Shirley
Phelps-Roper, an attorney and church
member, whose father, Fred Phelps, helped
establish Westboro in 1955. "God is
punishing this nation."
The church-which has about 75 members,
roughly 80 percent of whom are relatives by
blood or marriage-protests at funerals
without regard to the presumed sexual
orientation of the late soldier, Phelps-Roper
said. It also blames an assortment of
disasters-such as Hurricane Katrina, the
Sept. 11 attacks and AIDS--on what its
members view as the United States'
permissive morals in violation of biblical
dictates.
The group claims to have led 22,000
demonstrations since 1991 at parades,
funerals and other events. It has only
recently started picketing at funerals,
Phelps-Roper said. It announced the
intention to protest at several funerals of
fallen soldiers in Maryland in the past year
but did not show.
Before arriving at Snyder's funeral
yesterday, the members picketed at the
Naval Academy in Annapolis to voice
opposition to efforts to eliminate the
military's "don't ask, don't tell" policy.
Tomorrow, they plan protests at military
funerals in Colorado and Michigan.
The tactics of the Westboro Baptist Church
have offended people and prompted 22
states, including Maryland, to either enact or
propose laws to limit the rights of protesters
at funerals. Especially offended are military
veterans, many of whom showed up in
Westminster yesterday on motorcycles to
insulate the family members from the
protesters.
Some people, however, argue that the
soldiers whose funerals are being picketed
died to protect the right to free speech, even
for groups such as the Westboro Baptist
Church.
For legislators-and mourners-it has been
a delicate balancing act.
This year, 18 states have introduced
legislation to restrict protests of funerals and
memorial services, according to Heather
Morton, an analyst with the National
Conference of State Legislatures. Four
states-Missouri, Oklahoma, South Dakota
and Wisconsin-have enacted such laws this
year.
Kansas, the church's home state, has had a
law that bans picketing at funerals since
1993. Legislators there amended the law in
1995 and are tweaking it again this year,
largely in response to court challenges,
Morton said.
Morton said many states are passing laws
that create "buffer zones," setting a distance
within which protesters are not allowed and
times during which they cannot picket. They
favor these kinds of limitations because
similar laws have withstood court
challenges, Morton said.
In Minnesota, House legislators passed a bill
that requires protesters to stand back at least
1,000 feet. The Senate there is expected to
support the bill, too.
In Maryland, Del. Mary-Dulany James, a
Harford County Democrat, and Del. Joan
Cadden, an Anne Arundel County
Democrat, introduced a bill last month that
seeks to ban protests within an hour before
and after-as well as during-a funeral or
memorial service. The bill would require
protesters to stay at least 500 feet away and
not block mourners' access.
"Even if common decency and respect for
the dead cannot overcome the rights of free
speech, surely the very real risks of
compounding mental anguish and physical
ailments with the additional stress and
trauma that comes from disruptive protesters
should not be ignored," James told the
House Judiciary Committee last month.
But David Rocah, an attorney with the
American Civil Liberties Union of
Maryland, said that however wrong the
members of the Westboro Baptist Church
might be, their rights to free speech must be
protected.
"We believe [the Westboro Baptist Church
members] are fundamentally misguided,"
Rocah said. "People, somewhat
understandably, find it incomprehensible
that the Westboro Baptist Church is
targeting military funerals for their protests.
• . But the government doesn't get to
determine whose speech they like and whose
speech they don't like."
Legislation is not the answer, Rocah said.
"The answer, frankly, is what happened" at
Snyder's funeral, Rocah said. "There was no
law preventing the Westboro Baptist Church
from spouting its nonsense. And the
counterprotesters were there to show their
offense. There was no confrontation. This is
how it should've happened. That's
America."
A spokesman with
Sheriffs Department
"peaceful."
the Carroll County
said the protest was
"It went smoothly," said Maj. Thomas H.
Long, who added that the Westboro group
had contacted Westminster police earlier in
the week to request permission to protest.
"Everyone was very respectful of each
other."
To help shield the family from the
protesters, a group of motorcyclists called
the Patriot Guard Riders-who show up any
time Westboro members plan to picket a
military funeral-stood shoulder to shoulder
in the church parking lot, waving American
flags. They were there as a human buffer to
protect the family, said George Martin of
Aberdeen, who had taken the day off from
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his work at the Aberdeen Proving Ground.
The Patriot Guard Riders organized last fall
in response to the Westboro's protests at
military funerals and has chapters
nationwide.
More than 60 bikers from chapters in
Maryland, Virginia and Pennsylvania rode
their motorcycles to Snyder's funeral hoping
to counter the spectacle of protesters, he
said.
"We're here to show respect to the fallen
soldier and the family," said Martin, a 23-
year Army veteran. "I would like to think
someone would do this for my family."
The Snyders-who had been reluctant to do
interviews with newspapers and TV stations
all week and did not allow any news media
into the funeral-said yesterday that the
protests would not affect their celebration of
Matthew's life and proud service to the
Marines.
"Matthew had a wonderful tribute. He
deserved the tribute," said his aunt, Cathy
Menefee. "Anything the protesters do will
not diminish Matthew's impact on this
family, his home and his country."
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"Court Nixes $5M Verdict Against
Anti-Gay Funeral Protesters"
The Associated Press
September 25, 2009
Larry O'Dell
A federal appeals court on Thursday tossed
out a $5 million verdict against protesters
who carried signs with inflammatory
messages like "Thank God for dead
soldiers" outside the Maryland funeral of a
U.S. Marine killed in Iraq.
A three-judge panel of the 4th U.S. Circuit
Court of Appeals said the signs contained
"imaginative and hyperbolic rhetoric"
protected by the First Amendment. Such
messages are intended to spark debate and
cannot be reasonably read as factual
assertions about an individual, the court
said.
A jury in Baltimore had awarded Albert
Snyder damages for emotional distress and
invasion of privacy. The 2006 funeral of
Snyder's son, Marine Lance Cpl. Matthew
Snyder in Westminster, Md., was among
many military funerals that have been
picketed by members of the fundamentalist
Westboro Baptist Church in Kansas.
Albert Snyder's attorney, Sean E. Summers,
said he and his client were disappointed.
"The most troubling fact is it leaves these
grieving families helpless," Summers said.
"If you can't use the civil process, you have
no recourse."
He said he will appeal the ruling to either
the full appeals court or to the U.S. Supreme
Court.
"We feel we owe that to Mr. Snyder and
other families who have been harassed,
humiliated and abused," Summers said.
Shirley Phelps-Roper, whose father is
Westboro pastor Fred Phelps, said she was
pleased by the ruling.
"They had no case but they were hoping the
appellate court would not do their duty to
follow the rule of law and the appellate court
would not do that," said Phelps-Roper, who
was among those named in the lawsuit.
"They didn't change God and they didn't
stop us," she said. "What they managed to
do was give us a huge door, a global door of
utterance. Our doctrine is all over the world
because of what they did."
Members of the Topeka, Kan.-based church
have used protests at military funerals to
spread their belief that U.S. deaths in the
Iraq war are punishment for the nation's
tolerance of homosexuality. One of the signs
at Snyder's funeral combined the U.S.
Marine Corps motto with a slur against gay
men.
Other signs included "America is Doomed,"
"God Hates the USA!Thank God for 9/11,"
"Priests Rape Boys" and "Thank God for
IEDs," a reference to the roadside bombs
that have killed many U.S. troops in Iraq and
Afghanistan.
"As a threshold matter, as utterly distasteful
as these signs are, they involve matters of
public concern, including the issue of
homosexuals in the military, the sex-abuse
scandal within the Catholic Church, and the
political and moral conduct of the United
States and its citizens," Judge Robert King
wrote in the appeals court's opinion.
"Additionally, no reasonable reader could
interpret any of these signs as asserting
actual and objectively verifiable facts about
Snyder or his son," he wrote.
The court also said a written piece about
Snyder's funeral on the Westboro Web site
was protected by the First Amendment.
Unlike the signs, the Web site piece
specifically named the Snyders. Even so, the
court said, the missive was "primarily
concerned with the Defendants' strongly
held views on matters of public concern."
"Dead Marine's Father Ordered to
Pay Protesters' Legal Costs"
CNN
March 31, 2010
Emanuella Grinberg
The father of a Marine whose funeral was
picketed by the Westboro Baptist Church
says an order to pay the protesters' legal
costs in a civil claim is nothing less than a
"slap in the face."
"By the court making this decision, they're
not only telling me that they're taking their
side, but I have to pay them money to do
this to more soldiers and their families," said
Albert Snyder, whose son, Lance Cpl.
Matthew Snyder, was killed in action in Iraq
in 2006.
Members of the fundamentalist church
based in Topeka, Kansas, appeared outside
Snyder's funeral in 2006 in Westminster,
Maryland, carrying signs reading "You're
going to hell," "God hates you" and "Thank
God for dead soldiers."
Among the teachings of the church, which
was founded in 1955 by pastor Fred Phelps,
is the belief that God is punishing the United
States for "the sin of homosexuality"
through events such as soldiers' deaths.
Margie Phelps, the daughter of Fred Phelps
and the attorney representing the church in
its appeals, also said the money that the
church receives from Snyder will be used to
finance demonstrations. But she also said
that the order was a consequence of his
decision to sue the church over the
demonstration.
"Mr. Snyder and his attorneys have engaged
the legal system; there are some rules to that
legal engagement," said Phelps, a member
of Westboro who says she has participated
in more than 150 protests of military
funerals.
"They wanted to shut down the picketing so
now they're going to finance it," she said.
The 4th Circuit Court of Appeals on Friday
ordered that Snyder pay more than $16,000
in costs requested by Westboro for copies of
motions, briefs and appendices, according to
court documents.
In a motion filed in October, Snyder's
lawyer, who is representing him for free,
asked the court to dismiss the bill of costs,
or, alternatively, reduce the 50-cent fee per
page or charge Snyder only for copies that
were necessary to make their arguments on
appeal.
"We objected based upon ability to pay and
the fairness of the situation," Sean Summers
said.
The mostly pro-forma ruling is the latest
chapter in an ongoing legal saga that pits
privacy rights of grieving families against
the free speech rights of demonstrators,
however disturbing and provocative their
message.
Snyder's family sued the church and went to
trial in 2007 alleging privacy invasion,
intentional infliction of emotional distress
and civil conspiracy. A jury awarded the
family $2.9 million in compensatory
damages plus $8 million in punitive
damages, which were reduced to $5 million.
Westboro in 2008 appealed the case to the
4th District, which reversed the judgments a
year later, siding with the church's claims
that its First Amendment rights had been
violated.
"The protest was confined to a public area
under supervision and regulation of local
law enforcement and did not disrupt the
church service," the circuit court opinion
said. "Although reasonable people may
disagree about the appropriateness of the
Phelps' protest, this conduct simply does not
satisfy the heavy burden required for the tort
of intentional infliction of emotional distress
under Maryland law."
The U.S. Supreme Court has agreed to hear
the case to address issues of laws designed
to protect the "sanctity and dignity of
memorial and funeral services" as well as
the privacy of family and friends of the
deceased.
The justices will be asked to address how far
states and private entities such as cemeteries
and churches can go to justify picket-free
zones and the use of "floating buffers" to
silence or restrict speech or movements of
demonstrators exercising their constitutional
rights in a funeral setting.
Both Phelps and Snyder's attorney said they
were surprised that the 4th District chose to
weigh in on the issue of legal costs when
they could have waited until after the
Supreme Court hearing.
Phelps believes the ruling bodes well for her
side.
"It is a good harbinger of the fact that the
Supreme Court will remind this nation that
you don't have mob rule. The fact that so
many people hate these words does not
mean you can silence or penalize them.
That's supposed to be the great liberty that
we congratulate ourselves on protecting in
this nation. We strut all around the world
forcing people to give all the liberties we
supposedly have," she said.
Phelps anticipated that a Supreme Court
ruling in the church's favor would be
unpopular, but she said Westboro's
members viewed the potential outcome in
Biblical terms.
"When the Supreme Court unanimously
upholds the 4th Circuit, it's going to put this
country in a rage, and we will be expelled,"
she said. "But whenever it was time for an
epic event in the Bible, the thing that
happened right before is the prophets were
removed from the land, and that's what's
going to happen to us. . . . We're going to
sprint to the end of this race."
Snyder claims he is unable to pay any legal
costs in the case and is attempting to raise
funds on his son's site,
http://www.matthewsnyder.org/. He is
equally optimistic that he will prevail before
the Supreme Court.
"The American people keep my spirits lifted
a lot and give me hope. I think most of the
country is on my side on this issue," he said.
"Too many people have died to protect our
rights and freedoms to have them degraded
and spit upon like this church does."
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"Distress Over Parody Led to
First Amendment Case"
USA Today
May 16, 2007
Joan Biskupic
Jerry Falwell's round face and jocular
manner, coupled with his inclination for
moralistic rhetoric, made him a frequent
figure of satire. One extreme example turned
into a First Amendment milestone at the
U.S. Supreme Court.
In its November 1983 issue, Hustler
magazine published a satirical advertisement
that depicted Falwell having a drunken,
incestuous encounter with his mother in an
outhouse.
Falwell sued Hustler publisher Larry Flynt,
alleging that the satire had caused severe
emotional distress. A jury awarded Falwell
$200,000, and an appeals court affirmed the
decision.
However, in 1988 the Supreme Court threw
out the award and ruled that the First
Amendment protects the right to parody
public figures, even when the parody is
"outrageous." The unanimous opinion,
written by Chief Justice William Relnquist,
said a standard tied to outrageousness in
political discourse could subject publications
to the whims of jurors' tastes or views.
The court in Hustler Magazine v. Falwell
said public figures could not win money
damages for emotional distress unless they
could show "that the publication contains a
false statement of fact which was made with
'actual malice."'
By emphasizing the historical value of
political satire, the decision became part of a
line of cases, dating to New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan in 1964, that set a high bar for
public figures who allege libel and related
claims.
"It's one of the true cornerstones of modem
First Amendment law," says Rodney
Smolla, dean of the University of Richmond
law school, who wrote a book on the Hustler
case. "It says you cannot sue merely because
you're the butt of a vicious satire or joke. It
has to be a genuine libel."
"On the one hand, this ruling has made a lot
of our modem culture possible, everything
from Saturday Night Live to Jon Stewart.
But on the other hand, to Rev. Falwell and
those who supported him, the ruling
represents the moral decline of our culture."
Smolla says that after the ruling, Falwell
appeared on the lecture circuit with Flynt to
debate the case.
"He hated Flynt as a pornographer," Smolla
says. "But with Falwell, it really wasn't
personal. Larry Flynt used to refer to him in
an endearing way as 'my preacher."'
"Snyder v. Phelps: Intentional Infliction of Emotional
Distress and the First Amendment"
Concurring Opinions
March 16, 2010
Daniel Solove
In a previous post, I analyzed the intrusion
upon seclusion claim in Snyder v. Phelps,
580 F.3d 206 (4th Cir. 2009), a case where
the Supreme Court recently granted
certiorari.
Snyder involves tort claims against Fred
Phelps, pastor of the Westboro Baptist
Church, and others arising out of the
practice of Church members to picket the
funerals of U.S. soldiers. Church members
held a protest near the funeral of Albert
Snyder's son, who was killed in Iraq. The
Church preached anti-gay messages,
protesting funerals of dead soldiers as a way
to illustrate God's hatred of America for
tolerating homosexuality. Some signs said:
"God Hates the USA," "Fag troops," and
"Thank God for dead soldiers." A jury found
for Snyder, awarding him millions of dollars
in damages. The Fourth Circuit reversed on
First Amendment grounds. Snyder v.
Phelps, 580 F.3d 206 (4th Cir. 2009).
In this post, I'll analyze the intentional
infliction of emotional distress issues. The
tort provides:
One who by extreme and outrageous
conduct intentionally or recklessly
causes severe emotional distress to
another is subject to liability for such
emotional distress, and if bodily
harm to the other results from it, for
such bodily harm.
Restatement (2nd) of Torts, Sec. 46.
Here are the questions being considered by
the Supreme Court:
1. Does Hustler Magazine, Inc. v.
Falwell apply to a private person versus
another private person concerning a
private matter?
2. Does the First Amendment's freedom
of speech tenet trump the First
Amendment's freedom of religion and
peaceful assembly?
3. Does an individual attending a family
member's funeral constitute a captive
audience who is entitled to state
protection from unwanted
communication?
I'll address each in turn.
1. Does Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell
apply to a private person versus another
private person concerning a private
matter?
Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S.
86 (1988) involved a parody ad consisting of
a fake interview between the Reverend Jerry
Falwell and his mother, suggesting he had
sex with his mother. He won a jury verdict
for intentional infliction of emotional
distress. The Supreme Court held that the
First Amendment barred liability unless
Falwell (a public figure) proved actual
malice:
We conclude that public figures and
public officials may not recover for
the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress by reason of
publications such as the one here at
issue without showing in addition
that the publication contains a false
statement of fact which was made
with "actual malice," i. e., with
knowledge that the statement was
false or with reckless disregard as to
whether or not it was true.
In Snyder v. Phelps, the district court had
applied the standard in Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), which
provides an exception to the actual malice
standard for "private figures." But the
Fourth Circuit reasoned that Phelps's speech
involved a matter of public concern and
wasn't directed specifically at Snyder.
Whether Snyder was a public or private
figure was irrelevant.
Specifically, the court stated:
In assessing the Defendants' First
Amendment contentions, the
[district] court focused almost
exclusively on the Supreme Court's
opinion in Gertz, which it read to
limit the First Amendment's
protections for "speech directed by
private individuals against other
private individuals." Snyder v.
Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 2d 567, 577 (D.
Md. 2008). The court therefore
assessed whether Snyder was a
"public figure" under Gertz and
whether Matthew's funeral was a
"public event." See id 17
The Supreme Court has created a
separate line of First Amendment
precedent that is specifically
concerned with the constitutional
protections afforded to certain types
of speech, and that does not depend
upon the public or private status of
the speech's target. See Milkovich,
497 U.S. at 16; Hustler Magazine,
485 U.S. at 50. Thus, even if the
district court (as opposed to the jury)
concluded that Snyder and his son
were not "public figures," such a
conclusion alone did not dispose of
the Defendants' First Amendment
contentions. In focusing solely on the
status of the Snyders and the funeral,
and not on the legal issue concerning
the nature of the speech at issue, the
court failed to assess whether the
pertinent statements could
reasonably be interpreted as asserting
"actual facts" about an individual, or
whether they instead merely
contained rhetorical hyperbole. See
Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20; CACI,
536 F.3d at 293. Whether a statement
can reasonably be interpreted as
stating actual facts about an
individual is a question of law for the
court.
The court concluded later on:
A distasteful protest sign regarding
hotly debated matters of public
concern, such as homosexuality or
religion, is not the medium through
which a reasonable reader would
expect a speaker to communicate
objectively verifiable facts. In
addition, the words on these signs
were rude, figurative, and incapable
of being objectively proven or
disproven. Given the context and
tenor of these two signs, a reasonable
reader would not interpret them as
asserting actual facts about either
Snyder or his son.
I'm inclined to agree. Although I find the
speech by Phelps and the others at his
church to be despicable, it isn't specifically
directed at particular individuals. They
picket at particular funerals, but their
message is directed more generally at
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making anti-gay and anti-US comments, as
well as broad attacks against the troops.
Gertz doesn't fit because it involved a
defamatory claim against the plaintiff, and
there is no defamation against Snyder here.
Hustler, though, doesn't directly apply
because it involved a public figure. Snyder
isn't a public figure. Hence the issue before
the Supreme Court-what to do in this case,
which doesn't fall under Gertz or Hustler.
I think that the Hustler rule should apply
here. The speech involved in Snyder was
crude, obnoxious, and ridiculous, but it
wasn't directed at specific people and
couldn't reasonably be interpreted in making
any factual assertions about specific people.
It was certainly odious speech and caused
Snyder emotional distress. But we tolerate a
lot of speech that deeply offends people. I
can call you a jerk, an idiot, and express my
opinions about you freely, no matter how
crude. The fact you might be very upset
about this is outweighed by the First
Amendment protection of free speech. I
might also express views that you find
offensive: "All Republicans are selfish
idiots" or "All Democrats are weak-minded
fools." This speech might be insulting to
you, but it's protected by the First
Amendment.
Where I start to run into problems is when I
invade your privacy or defame you. If I just
say something that offends you, it's not
enough-and shouldn't be enough-to
allow you to prevail in a lawsuit. That's
because of the danger that unpopular speech
will strike many people as offensive, and it
will be easy for juries to be offended to and
punish the speaker. If I say that "Yankee
fans are morons" in New York City, I
certainly wouldn't want to face a jury trial
there brought by an offended fan.
In On Liberty, John Stuart Mill argues
(persuasively in my opinion), that people
should be free to say and do what they want
so long as they don't harm others (self-
regarding acts). He examines the objection
that there are few purely self-regarding acts
since others might be deeply offended by a
person's conduct or speech:
There are many who consider as an
injury to themselves any conduct
which they have a distaste for, and
resent it as an outrage to their
feelings; as a religious bigot, when
charged with disregarding the
religious feelings of others, has been
known to retort that they disregard
his feelings, by persisting in their
abominable worship or creed. But
there is no parity between the feeling
of a person for his own opinion, and
the feeling of another who is
offended at his holding it; no more
than between the desire of a thief to
take a purse, and the desire of the
right owner to keep it. And a
person's taste is as much his own
peculiar concern as his opinion or his
purse.
I agree with Mill. We need to tolerate a lot
of offensiveness in society. There are no
purely self-regarding acts, since our
behavior will invariably offend some people
who hold different values and opinions. But
if the law were to recognize being offended
as an injury, it would swallow up the
category of self-regarding acts. Therefore,
the law must not recognize as a cognizable
injury merely being offended (or even
deeply offended).
On the other hand, we must protect against
direct attacks, false rumors, invasions of
privacy, and so on. Speech used as a weapon
to attack specific people and cause them
emotional distress should be actionable.
Such speech should rise above mere insults
or offensive messages-it should be
defamatory, invasive of privacy, or
harassing. A line should be drawn between
generally offensive speech and speech that is
specifically targeted at particular individuals
so as to injure them.
I'd be all for allowing Snyder to recover
against Phelps if Phelps invaded the funeral
or disrupted it with his speech. But the facts
indicate this didn't happen here. Snyder
found out about Phelps's speech afterwards,
and he became offended (and rightly so).
But I think that as offensive as Phelps's
speech was, the Fourth Circuit was
correct-the speech wasn't directed at
Snyder, and therefore the first question
posed to the Supreme Court above isn't
entirely accurate. This wasn't speech about a
private matter-it was speech of public
concern directed to the public.
2. Does the First Amendment's freedom
of speech tenet trump the First
Amendment's freedom of religion and
peaceful assembly?
This is an interesting question, but it doesn't
apply to this case. The question would apply
if Phelps's protest disrupted the funeral.
Suppose Snyder were having a funeral
procession out in public, and Phelps made
his protest there, disrupting Snyder's event.
We would then have Snyder's First
Amendment rights to freedom of religion
and assembly (a funeral is often religious
and a funeral procession can be understood
to be a form of assembly) pitted against
Phelps's First Amendment rights to the
speech. But that isn't this case, as the funeral
was held in private and Phelps was far away.
3. Does an individual attending a family
member's funeral constitute a captive
audience who is entitled to state
protection from unwanted
communication?
I don't think this question applies to this
case since Snyder's family wasn't a captive
audience to Phelps's speech. In fact, Snyder
didn't even hear or notice Phelps's speech
until after the funeral. If he were a captive
audience, however, then the First
Amendment analysis would have to take that
into account.
In short, while Phelps's speech was odious,
it was general enough and sufficiently
distant from the funeral so as to avoid (1)
making specific statements about Snyder
and (2) invading or disrupting the funeral.
Accordingly, it deserves First Amendment
protection.
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"Invasion of Privacy and the
Freedom of Speech"
The Volokh Conspiracy
March 8, 2010
Eugene Volokh
The Snyder v. Phelps jury held defendants
liable not just for intentional infliction of
emotional distress, but also for invasion of
privacy. "Invasion of privacy" covers
several torts, but the ones alleged here were
"intrusion upon seclusion" (because the
picketing was outside a funeral, albeit 1000
feet away) and "publicity given to private
life" (apparently because of the Phelpsians'
statements on their Web site that plaintiff
and his wife "raised [the deceased] for the
devil," "RIPPED that body apart and taught
Matthew to defy his Creator, to divorce, and
to commit adultery," "taught him how to
support the largest pedophile machine in the
history of the entire world, the Roman
Catholic monstrosity," and "taught Matthew
to be an idolator").
Even if the disclosure tort is constitutionally
permissible-most lower courts have held it
is, though the Supreme Court hasn't opined
on this-it has been interpreted quite
narrowly, and I don't see anything in this
case that involves the sort of disclosure of
highly embarrassing personal information
(e.g., medical or sexual history) generally
required for liability. Both the site and the
picketing is offensive because of the
viewpoint they express, the harsh language
that they use, and their expression of the
viewpoint in a way that's personalized to a
recently killed soldier-not because it
reveals some embarrassing secrets.
The intrusion upon seclusion tort generally
focuses on conduct that is offensive
regardless of the message it expresses (the
Restatement of Torts illustrations are
entering a patient's hospital room to take a
photograph over the patient's objection,
photographing through someone's bedroom
window through a telescope, tapping
someone's phone, getting someone's bank
records using a court order, and calling
someone every day for a month at
inconvenient times). The tort is
constitutional precisely because it's content-
neutral. Here, though, the intrusion stemmed
not just from the proximity of the picketing
to the funeral-there must have been a good
deal of speech within 1000 feet of the
church at which the funeral service was
being conducted, and surely one wouldn't
call all of it "highly offensive intrusion upon
seclusion"-but also from the message of
the picketing.
Applying the intrusion tort here thus raises
pretty much the same overbreadth,
vagueness, and viewpoint discrimination
problems as does apply the emotional
distress tort. It may be a little narrower
because it at least formally requires some
sort of physical proximity with the plaintiffs.
But it's also broader because it doesn't even
require a finding of outrageousness (only the
intrusion's being "highly offensive to a
reasonable person"), and in any case the
narrowing is pretty slight, if speech within
1000 feet of the funeral qualifies as physical
proximity.
And one can easily see how dangerous this
tort, if applicable here, could potentially be:
It could conceivably lead to massive liability
for antiabortion picketing within 1000 feet
of abortion clinics (on the theory that people
who are going in for emotionally draining
and possibly life-altering medical
procedures are just as entitled to "seclusion"
as people who are going to a funeral). It
could lead to massive liability for protests
within 1000 feet of churches (including the
Phelpsians), mosques, and synagogues, on
the theory that people are entitled to
"seclusion" in their ordinary religious
services as well as in funeral religious
services. It could lead to universities' being
allowed to punish students for distributing or
posting allegedly offensive materials near
dorms; and more.
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"Slander not Protected
by 1st Amendment"
The Baltimore Sun
March 22, 2010
Nathan Tucker
Do protesters have the constitutionally
protected right to picket your fallen soldier's
funeral and harass the proceedings? That is
the question the Supreme Court will attempt
to answer after it agreed to hear Snyder v.
Phelps, a case in which the jury awarded a
$5 million verdict against a Kansas pastor
who has made headlines by protesting the
funerals of fallen service members.
Previous court rulings may suggest that the
answer is yes. But a careful examination of
the wording of the Constitution-not to
mention simple common sense-suggests
otherwise.
Four years ago, Marine Lance Cpl. Matthew
A. Snyder was killed while serving in Iraq,
and his family planned for a private funeral
at their church in Westminster. The Rev.
Fred W. Phelps Sr., the pastor of Westboro
Baptist Church in Topeka, Kan., and six of
his family members decided to stage a
protest at the funeral.
The Westboro Baptist Church believes that
God hates America because of its tolerance
of homosexuality. During this particular
funeral protest, they carried signs stating
"God Hates the USA," "America is
doomed," "Semper fi fags" and "Thank God
for dead soldiers."
The father of the fallen marine, Albert
Snyder, sued the protesters for, among other
things, intentional infliction of emotional
distress. The jury awarded Mr. Snyder $5
million in damages, a verdict that was later
overturned by the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals on the grounds that the protesters'
speech was protected by the First
Amendment.
The First Amendment, however, provides
that, "Congress shall make no law .
abridging the freedom of speech." But there
is no federal, state or local law at issue in
this case. No one is arguing that the
government tried to suppress Mr. Phelps'
speech in any way.
This suit is entirely private in nature. It
involved the offensive remarks made by one
private individual against another private
individual at a private event. In a type of
personal injury suit, the aggrieved party
sued the harasser in court for emotional
damages.
How, then, does the First Amendment apply
to this case at all? In cases such as New York
Times v. Sullivan and Shelley v. Kraemer,
the Supreme Court attempted to justify the
First Amendment's reach into private suits
by relying on the tenuous argument that,
because the power of the state is used to
enforce the verdict (through the court
system), the government is suppressing the
speech at issue.
In essence, the court reasons that, since the
court system coercively transfers money
from A to B because of A's speech, that it
becomes a government restriction on speech.
It is an ingenious but dangerous argument
that brings every single court action under
the Constitution's orbit. So long as there is a
plausible political or social commentary
behind one's actions, he is now immune
from liability.
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If this were the case, a minority resident
would have no recourse against his
prejudiced neighbors if they decided to
demonstrate outside his property every
night, day after day. Or a host could not
evict a rowdy house guest who was
becoming verbally abusive if that guest was
doing so as a political commentary. And
suits for slander and libel would be
impossible.
And taking the court's precedent to its
logical conclusion, no one could sue for
monetary damages because, if awarded, the
court would be depriving the defendant of
private property without just compensation,
in violation of the 5th Amendment. And no
marriage could be dissolved, because the
Contract Clause prohibits states from
breaking contracts.
Since these results were clearly not intended
by the Constitution, the court should use this
case to overrule its past precedents and
affirm that the mere application of neutral
principles to enforce private suits does not
constitute government action. The
Constitution was intended to only govern
public behavior-not private.
"What the Supreme Court Sees
in Snyder v. Phelps"
York Daily Record
April 12, 2010
Jeff Frantz
In the time since the U.S. Supreme Court
agreed to hear Snyder v. Phelps-a Spring
Garden Township man's lawsuit against the
members of a church who protested his
son's military funeral--court watches have
wondered why it took up the case and what
a ruling might mean.
Albert Snyder won his lawsuit against the
Westboro Baptist Church for defamation
and invasion of privacy after the Rev. Fred
Phelps and other church members held a
demonstration 1,000 feet outside the funeral
of Snyder's son, Lance Cpl. Matthew
Snyder. The Fourth U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals overturned that ruling, saying the
Phelps' signs, while offensive, were
protected speech.
The Supreme Court rarely takes cases just
because it disagrees with a lower court's
decision, said Clay Calvert, a First
Amendment expert at the University of
Florida. Most often, justices seek to mend
"splits" in the law, when appeals courts have
offered contradictory rulings.
But while there are similar cases with
different rulings, the Snyder case appears
unique, without a split to be addressed,
Calvert said.
So why, from the 10,000 requests it will
receive this year, did the Court agree to hear
Snyder's appeal after its term opens October
4?
Law professors offered a number of
suggestions based on the three questions
Snyder's attorneys asked the court to rule
on.
It is important to remember that only four of
the nine justices need to favor hearing a case
for it to wind up on the Court's docket, said
UCLA law professor Eugene Volokh.
The four judges voting to hear a case might
have different reasons-two might strongly
disagree with the lower court's decision, two
might want to explore a constitutional issue,
for example-but all that matters is they
voted yes.
Question 1: Does Hustler Magazine, Inc. v.
Falwell apply to a private person versus
another private person concerning a private
matter?
In 1988, the Court ruled that a Hustler
Magazine parody of the Rev. Jerry Falwell
was protected speech and did not violate the
legal concept of intentional infliction of
emotional distress.
The case has widely been used as precedent,
Calvert said.
Falwell-a nationally known minister-was
legally a public figure, said Christina Wells,
a law professor at the University of
Missouri. Lance Cpl. Snyder was a private
figure. Those are two different standards.
By taking this case, Wells said, the Court
might address whether the Falwell ruling
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applies to private figures.
Some state courts have ruled differently
about private figures in somewhat similar
cases, Volokh said.
"This is an important issue where the
supreme court's guidance could be very
helpful," Volokh said.
But it is complicated.
"You have public speech outside a private
ceremony," Calvert said. "You have a public
setting, but speech about a private figure.
But you have speech about public policy."
Westboro wrote about Matthew Snyder on
its Web site, but most of the signs it
displayed outside his funeral, while
offensive, appeared to be more broadly
directed, Wells said. The justices will have
to account for that.
Question 2: Does the First Amendment's
freedom of speech tenet trump the First
Amendment's freedom of religion and
peaceful assembly?
Volokh and Wells didn't understand the
exact intent of this question.
Volokh said Snyder's lawyers might further
develop it in their written arguments, but
right now it doesn't seem specific enough to
pique the Court's interest.
He added that the justice's clerks-highly
skilled lawyers who do a great deal of
research-will sometimes present a justice
with more information about a specific
question based upon their own interest and
expertise. That might have happened here.
Question 3: Does an individual attending a
family member's funeral constitute a captive
audience who is entitled to state protection
from unwanted communication?
Traditionally, courts have given people
attending funerals greater protections
because they are seen as vulnerable.
That's why lower courts have upheld state
bans that require protesters to stand a certain
distance from a funeral, provided those bans
don't single out one type of speech, Volokh
said.
The Westboro protesters followed such a
ban, standing 1,000 feet away from Matthew
Snyder's funeral as required by Maryland
law, which offers one of the most generous
buffer zones in the nation, said Wells, who
has written about such laws.
The legality of such bans is not in play here,
Wells said, and she is not sure how Snyder
can argue for state protection.
"That's not really an issue in this case," she
said. "The fourth circuit opinion doesn't
deal with that in any way."
There's also a question of what makes a
person a "captive audience."
Wells noted that Albert Snyder did not see
the protestors outside his son's funeral, and
only learned about them later from news
reports. Can he still qualify as a captive
audience? she asked.
Reasonable people might agree Westboro's
speech was hateful and offensive, Volokh
said, but by staying outside the buffer zone,
the church members were making it in a
public space.
If the court accepts that bystanders in that
public space are a captive audience, Volokh
said, then people could be considered a
captive audience for almost any speech.
Funerals will not be the only topic
considered when the Court discusses this
question, Volokh said.
Some more conservative justices might be
more inclined to hear arguments that
funerals should be protected, Volokh said,
but would have to also consider similar
arguments made about women entering
abortion clinics.
Protesters outside abortion clinics are much
less restricted than funeral protestors,
Volokh said, and some conservative justices
are on record as saying the clinic restrictions
are too broad. A ruling could affect both
environments.
Really, Wells said, this question will likely
be decided by those types of arguments.
"If you recognize a right to be free of
offensive speech in public," Wells said, "it
would have great implications for
protestors."
Case timeline
Mar. 3, 2006: Marine Lance Cpl. Matthew
Snyder, 20, is killed in a Humvee crash in
Al Anbar province, Iraq.
Mar. 10, 2006: Matthew Snyder is buried in
Westminster, Md., after a funeral at a nearby
Catholic Church. The Rev. Fred Phelps and
members of his Westboro Baptist Church
stage a protest 1,000 feet outside the
ceremony, including signs reading "Semper
Fi, Semper Fags" and "God hates dead
soldiers."
June 5, 2006: Albert Snyder, Matthew
Snyder's father, files a defamation suit
against Phelps and the Westboro Church in
federal court, alleging church members
violated the family's right to privacy and
defamed Matthew Snyder on its Web site.
Oct. 31, 2007: A jury rules in favor of
Albert Snyder and awards a $10.9 million
verdict, including $8 million in punitive
damages.
Feb. 4, 2008: A judge reduces the verdict to
$5 million.
Sept. 24, 2009: The Fourth U.S. Circuit
court of appeals rules in favor of Phelps,
overturning the verdict.
Mar. 8, 2010: The U.S. Supreme Court
agrees to hear Snyder's appeal of the Fourth
Circuit's decision when its next term begins
in October.
"Should Protests Be Allowed
at Military Funerals?"
US. News Weekly
July 2, 2010
Timothy Zick
Free-speech controversies have often
involved highly offensive and obnoxious
expression: burning the U.S. flag, marching
in Nazi regalia in a city populated by
Holocaust survivors, and insinuating that a
pastor had incestuous relations with his
mother in an outhouse. But in each of these
cases, the courts upheld the right to
communicate the offensive message. Enter
the Phelps family, who make up most of the
congregation at the Westboro Baptist
Church in Topeka, Kan. For years, they have
conveyed homophobic and sacrilegious
messages near the sites of military funerals.
When the family of a Marine killed in action
sued over one such protest, a jury thought
this speech crossed the line. But a federal
court of appeals held that the First
Amendment protected the Phelps's noxious
speech
The case, Snyder v. Phelps, is not about the
dignity or psychic well-being of the father of
a fallen Marine. Nor is it solely about the
fate of the decidedly unsympathetic
speakers. As is often true when a dispute
reaches the Supreme Court, the stakes are
much higher
On the line is more than half a century of
legal precedents holding that governmental
neutrality is critical to the functioning of a
free marketplace of ideas, and that debate on
public matters must be, as the Supreme
Court said in New York Times v. Sullivan,
"uninhibited, robust, and wide open."
Sullivan involved the potentially crippling
imposition of civil liability on a newspaper
for making false statements about the
conduct of Southern public officials during
the civil rights era. The case demonstrated
that the civil tort system poses as grave a
threat to free speech as any government
censor.
For very sound reasons, we have not
allowed the government to determine, either
through direct regulation or the tort system,
which words are too offensive or what
conduct too vile to be experienced in public.
We have required that those offended avert
their eyes, endure the offense, or engage in
counter-speech. We have generally
demanded that those in public sustain the
psychic blows that speech can sometimes
inflict. We have done all of this on the
theory that tolerance of offense is far
preferable to empowering a government
censor to dictate a code of public manners or
determine what qualifies as suitable
discourse in the body politic. This approach
makes our First Amendment exceptional
among the speech regimes of the world.
If juries are empowered to enforce a code of
decency and respect through high damage
awards, then we must also permit
government officials, high and petty, to haul
boorish and insensitive speakers before the
constable, the student disciplinary board, or
the prosecutor. Do not assume, either, that
this threat only applies to a few oddballs
carrying on within eyesight or earshot of
funeral ceremonies. Once the line of public
decency is drawn, any speaker who crosses
it may be punished. Further, the Web, where
uninhibited discourse has been the norm,
may be the next space slated for cleansing
(indeed, the jury verdict in Snyder was based
in part on a Web posting).
The speech activities of the Westboro
church are undeniably repugnant. However,
there are limits to what lawmakers can do to
make the rest of us comfortable when we
venture outside or online. A society that
allows the imposition of million-dollar
judgments for waving placards and posting
opinions because a jury or judge finds them
to be outrageous or offensive has lost
confidence in its ability to shoulder the
burdens that accompany freedom of speech.
The ignominious Phelps family has
reminded us that free speech is not free.
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"Should Protests Be Allowed
at Military Funerals?"
US. News Weekly
July 2, 2010
Walter Dellinger
In recent years, a family associated with a
Kansas church has taken to organizing
protests at the private funerals of fallen
American soldiers around the country with
hateful messages like "Thank God for Dead
Soldiers" and "Semper Fi Fags." Later this
year, the Supreme Court will hear a case
based on one such protest, concerning a jury
verdict awarded to the father of a soldier.
The funeral protesters claim that their
conduct is absolutely protected by the First
Amendment. In that case, at the request of
Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, I filed a
pro bono, friend-of-the-court brief,
supported by 58 senators, urging the court to
conclude that laws safeguarding families
from disruptive protests at funerals are
consistent with the First Amendment
Proper burials play a crucial role in helping
the bereaved mourn the dead. The disruption
of a funeral interferes with the necessary
emotional process of grieving and can inflict
severe psychological, and even physical
distress, on the bereaved. In recognition of
the vulnerability of mourners, American
courts have long recognized a "right" to a
decent burial. As one court said over 100
years ago, "[w]e can imagine no clearer or
dearer right in the gamut of civil liberty and
security than to bury our dead in peace and
unobstructed; none more sacred to the
individual, nor more important of
preservation and protection from the point of
view of public welfare and decency;
certainly none where the law need less
hesitate to impose upon a willful violator
responsibility for the uttermost
consequences of his act."
Congress and 46 different state legislatures
have enacted laws to minimize picketing and
other forms of disruptive activity in or near
cemeteries during a funeral. The details of
these laws vary, but they generally prohibit
all demonstrations during, and in the time
immediately before and after, a funeral at
the cemetery and in a narrow buffer zone
around it. The Respect for America's Fallen
Heroes Act, which Congress enacted in
2006, is representative. It prohibits
demonstrations at national cemeteries,
including Arlington National Cemetery, for
an hour before and after a funeral or
memorial service, as well as noisy
disturbances of the peace within 150 feet of
a road into or out of the property.
Congress carefully crafted the law to
comport with the First Amendment. The
Supreme Court has held that laws governing
the time, place, and manner of speech are
permissible, so long as the laws don't
discriminate based on the subject of the
speech, serve a significant public interest,
and are carefully designed to leave open
alternative means for communication of the
information.
The federal and state laws regulating
protests at funerals do just that. They
prohibit any type of disruptive speech or
conduct at a funeral, not just a particular
message. They serve the important purpose
of safeguarding the rights of the bereaved to
a solemn occasion to bury their dead. And
they leave open numerous alternative
options for protests: The protesters in the
case before the court have staged
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demonstrations at state capitols and other
government facilities on the same day they
have protested at funerals.
The right to speak freely about matters of
public concern does not encompass abusive
conduct intended to invade a private
memorial ceremony and injure its
participants. Protesters are free to convey
their message in virtually any public manner
they choose. But they are not free to hijack a
family's private funeral as a vehicle for
expression of their own hate. Nothing in the
First Amendment requires otherwise.
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"Cuccinelli Says Funeral Protest Case
Could Curtail Free Speech"
The Washingon Post
June 1, 2010
Rosalind Helderman
Post Supreme Court reporter Robert Barnes
wrote this morning about the case Snyder v.
Phelps, including Virginia Attorney General
Ken Cuccinelli's decision not to write a
friend of the court brief on behalf of plantiff
Albert Snyder. Virginia and Maine are the
only two states in the country who haven't
joined the suit, which will be heard by the
court this fall, on behalf of Snyder, who is
suing the Westboro Baptist Church in
Topeka, Kan., and its founding pastor, Fred
W. Phelps Sr. for disrupting the funeral of
his late son, Marine Lance Cpl. Matthew
Snyder.
The Kansas church has made a show of
picketing funerals of military personnel
killed in Iraq and Afghanistan, arguing
military deaths are America's punishment
for tolerating homosexuality. Cuccinelli
spokesman Brian Gottstein told Barnes that
Virginia's attorney general chose not to get
involved with the case because he is afraid
of setting a precedent to allow free speech to
be curbed if it causes "emotional distress,"
as Snyder's lawyers have argued.
Through Gottstein, Cuccinelli has just issued
a fuller explanation of his decision not to
write a friend of the court brief. In a
statement, Gottstein said the attorney
general "deplores the absolutely vile and
despicable acts of Fred Phelps and his
followers" and has great sympathy for the
Snyder family and family of other military
personnel disrupted by the church protests.
But he reiterated Cuccinelli is concerned
about the precedent that could be set in the
case.
In a statement he said:
If protesters-whether political, civil
rights, pro-life, or environmental-
said something that offended the
object of the protest to the point
where that person felt damaged, the
protesters could be sued. It then
becomes a very subjective and
difficult determination as to when
the line is crossed from severely
offensive speech to that which
inflicts emotional distress. Several
First Amendment scholars agree.
Virginia already has a statute that we
believe balances free speech rights
while stopping and even jailing those
who would be so contemptible as to
disrupt funeral or memorial services.
That statute, 18.2-415(B), punishes
as a class one misdemeanor (up to
one year in jail and a fine of up to
$2,500) someone who willfully
disrupts a funeral or memorial
service to the point of preventing or
interfering with the orderly conduct
of the event. We do not think that
regulation of speech through vague
common law torts like intentional
infliction of emotional distress
strikes the proper balance between
free speech and avoiding the
unconscionable disruption of
funerals. We think our statute does.
So long as the protesters stay within
the letter of the law, the Constitution
protects their right to express their
views. In Virginia, if Phelps or
others attempt this repugnant
behavior, cross the line and violate
the law, the attorney general's office
stands ready to provide any
assistance to local prosecutors to
vindicate the law.
"A Call for Justice"
Marine Corps Times
April 5, 2010
Dan Lamothe
Albert Snyder's eyes well up with tears
when recalling his son's funeral.
More than 1,200 people packed St. John
Catholic Church in Westminster, Md., on
March 10, 2006, to pay their respects to 20-
year-old Marine Lance Cpl. Matthew
Snyder, who died when his Humvee rolled
over in Iraq's Anbar province while he
manned the vehicle's gun turret.
On the trip from the church to a nearby
veterans cemetery, small-town patriotism
was on full display. Cars pulled over and
allowed the funeral procession to pass.
Strangers on the street saluted.
"I've never seen a funeral like this in my
life," Snyder said, his voice wavering. "It
was just amazing to see."
The funeral was marred, however, by seven
uninvited guests-members of the Westboro
Baptist Church flew in from their
headquarters in Topeka, Kan., to picket
outside the church service.
Carrying signs reading "Semper Fi Fags,"
"Thank God for Dead Soldiers" and "Thank
God for IEDs," the church members
infuriated passersby and mourners just as
they have at hundreds of military funerals
nationwide.
Led by founder Fred Phelps, the group
maintains that God kills U.S. troops as
punishment for the country's tolerance of
homosexuality, greed and abortion.
Snyder just wasn't going to let the group
disparage his fallen warrior. He sued the
church.
Four years after his son's death, the
automation equipment salesman received
word that his case will be heard by the
Supreme Court in October.
A small team of lawyers representing
Snyder will argue that Phelps' right to free
speech does not supersede mourners' rights
to lay their family members to rest without
facing an insulting public protest.
Snyder is seeking $5 million in emotional
and punitive damages from Westboro
Baptist and members of the Phelps family,
and hopes a legal victory will spare others
the torment he and hundreds of other
military families have been forced to endure.
"I knew these people were going to be at
Matt's funeral, but in my mind, this day was
about Matt, and that's strictly what it was
about," Snyder said. "People think that these
were seven people who showed up with
little signs. There were people flipping them
the finger, yelling at them from cars. And
this is the way you're going to bury
someone who died for their country?"
Fighting back
Snyder took on the church three months
after he buried his son.
On June 5, 2006, Snyder sued the Westboro
church for defamation, invasion of privacy
and intentional infliction of emotional
distress.
His suit charged that a screed posted on one
of the church's Web sites defamed the
Snyders. Titled "The Burden of Marine
Lance Cpl. Matthew A. Snyder," the rant
accused his parents of raising their son "for
the devil" and of teaching him to commit
adultery and divorce and to "support the
largest pedophile machine in the history of
the entire world, the Roman Catholic
monstrosity."
Snyder made the invasion of privacy claim
because the Westboro group "intentionally
entered upon the solitude and seclusion of
the plaintiff and his family members" and
"intruded upon the plaintiffs private affairs
and concerns."
Finally, Snyder argued the church meant to
harm him and his family emotionally.
Snyder did not ask for a specific amount of
money but said the Westboro members
should have to pay both emotional damages,
his court costs and punitive damages for
their "reprehensible actions."
Snyder was torn over whether to sue the
church. He had to endure hours of medical
and psychiatric testing, to validate claims he
had been harmed by the protests. His doctors
later said his diabetes and depression
worsened after he found the screed.
"I thought about it and about what they did
to me, and how Matt would have felt if
somebody had done this to one of his
brothers from Iraq," he said. "And I decided,
'I'm going to go through with this."'
The church sought to quash the lawsuit,
arguing during a trial in Baltimore in
October 2007 that its members did not
intend to cause emotional distress. Their
protest was kept 1,000 feet from the
church's doors, they pointed out. They
needed to preach to "doomed America" in
public places to let it be known the
acceptance of homosexuality is wrong, they
said.
On Oct. 31, 2007, the jury ruled in favor of
Snyder, awarding him $10.9 million in
damages--enough to effectively bankrupt
the 70-member church.
Snyder conducted dozens of media
interviews that week, reflecting on the way
he had once been pushed around by many
people in his life, only to latch on to the
church's actions and stand up for himself.
'An insult'
The Westboro group immediately appealed
the decision, and legal experts and scholars
wondered aloud whether the case would
stand up before a higher court.
In February 2008, a federal judge in
Baltimore reduced the damages to $5
million. The church appealed to the
Supreme Court, but the justices declined to
hear the case. It then turned to the 4th U.S.
Circuit Court of Appeals.
A three-judge panel for the Virginia-based
court overturned the original decision, ruling
placards and Internet screed were protected
as free speech under the First Amendment."
"As utterly distasteful as these signs are,
they involve matters of public concern,
including the issue of homosexuals in the
military, the sex-abuse scandal within the
Catholic Church, and the political and moral
conduct of the United States and its
citizens," Judge Robert King wrote in the
court's opinion.
Snyder struggled with his next step, too.
In an interview, Snyder said balancing the
legal battle, media requests and day-to-day
life has been costly-both emotionally and
financially.
Snyder has about $50,000 in legal bills, even
though his attorneys do not charge him for
their time. He launched a Web site,
www.matthewsnyder.org, to help offset the
bills but is "still a long way off' from
paying for everything.
"I don't want to take anyone's free speech
away," Snyder said. "But I don't want
anybody to do anything to the people who
gave us that free speech. Too many people
have died to protect it, and for someone to
hide behind it and abuse it is an insult."
Legal experts are uncertain how the case
will play out. They question whether the
court will rule in favor of Snyder if it means
the right to free speech will be limited in any
way. Yet the Supreme Court's willingness to
take up the case has raised plenty of
questions about what it could do.
One possibility is that the court wants to
establish a clear definition of the emotional
distress tort, a body of laws that address how
behavior that results in extreme emotional
distress should be handled in the justice
system, said Eugene Volokh, an expert on
free speech and religious freedom laws at
the University of California, Los Angeles.
One famous case that addressed emotional
distress, Hustler Magazine Inc. v. Falwell, is
referenced specifically in Snyder's request
to the Supreme Court. In 1988, the Supreme
Court ruled that Jerry Falwell, a nationally
known televangelist, could not collect
emotional damages from the publication for
printing a fictional parody that described
him having a drunken sexual encounter with
his mother in an outhouse.
Since Falwell was a well-known public
figure, the burden was on him to prove
Hustler specifically meant to cause him
harm. Snyder's lawyers question whether
the same principle should apply to the
grieving father of a fallen Marine.
Hard feelings
At the other end of the legal proceedings is
the Phelps family, which has challenged
state laws limiting picketing at funerals in
the past. They are unapologetic for their
actions and remain antagonistic toward the
military.
In an interview, Shirley Phelps-Roper, a
lawyer and one of the seven picketing
outside Lance Cpl. Snyder's funeral, said the
destruction of the world is imminent, and the
military won't be able to save it. In fact, she
says service members will turn into
cowards.
"At the front of the pack is going to be those
military brutes," she said. "They're young
and strong and can outrun the rest of the
rebels. And they're [not] going to give a
hoot" about everyone else.
She then took a direct swipe at Marines: "It
ain't going to be about the badass Marine
because first, they're not badass. They think
they're badass. If they're so badass, how
come they keep getting killed?"
The Westboro group cannot picket every
funeral because of its small number so it
"relies on God" for guidance, she said. Each
month, the members announce the events
they plan to picket and change their
schedule if another event with a higher
profile presents itself.
One example: In February, Phelps family
members decided to picket for three days
outside a conference in Southern Virginia
held by the Joint Improvised Explosive
Device Defeat Organization, a Defense
Department organization launched to
develop technology and tactics to defeat
roadside bombs. But they pulled away when
they realized they could picket outside the
Johnstown, Pa., funeral of Rep. John
Murtha, D.-Pa., a former Marine.
"We said instead of going back over to the
JIEDDO conference, we'll kick that piece to
the curb and instead picket Murtha, because
he, after all, is a dead soldier," Phelps-Roper
said.
Snyder acknowledges the police kept the
Phelpses at a distance at his son's funeral
and he didn't see their placards until he
turned on the television later.
Nonetheless, he said, the Phelpses' actions
forced him to worry about what his
daughters might see when he should have
been allowed to simply mourn and observe
the loss of his son.
"They're really just sick people," Snyder
said of the Phelps family. "They came to my
church. I didn't go to theirs. They came
from Kansas with a specific purpose, and
that was to get their message out. And they
didn't care who it hurt."
Snyder v. Phelps
The Supreme Court could review three
major topics in Albert Snyder's case against
the Westboro Baptist Church. The topics:
Speech and privacy. Snyder contends the 4th
U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in Richmond,
Va., was wrong in protecting the church's
speech since it attacked a "private" figure,
Snyder, concerning a private matter, the
funeral. The chuch argues that Snyder is not
a private figure with regard to his son's
death because he had already granted media
interviews and that its protests are focused
on public issues, making them protected
speech.
Speech and religion. Snyder contends the
First Amendment, used to overturn Snyder's
initial settlement, allows the Phelpses'
freedom of speech to trump Snyder's right
to mourn his son in a private religious
ceremony. The church has countered by
saying its members picketed on a public
street, on issues that were of public interest.
Funeral attendees' rights. Even if the
appellate court's decision to uphold the
Phelpses' free speech was appropriate,
according to Snyder's lawyers, it failed to
consider that Snyder was a "captive
audience" at his son's funeral. A federal
appeals court already has ruled in another
case involving the church that the
government is allowed to protect private
citizens from unwanted communication
when they cannot avoid it, Snyder points
out. The Phelpses counter that the argument
is not relevant, since the previous case
focused on whether a state law banning
picketing within 300 feet of a funeral was
constitutional-a separate issue.
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In early March 2006, two Marines arrived at
Al Snyder's Westminster, Md., home and
told him that his 20-year-old son, Lance Cpl.
Matthew A. Snyder, had been killed while
serving in Iraq. Though the shock and grief
of his loss were powerful, Al Snyder wanted
to honor his son in the best way he could:
with a peaceful, respectful funeral.
But he didn't get that. A group of church
members from Westboro Baptist Church in
Topeka, Kans., flew to Maryland to protest
at Matthew's funeral. Fred Phelps, founder
of the church (note: link may not be safe for
work), picketed near the church with his two
daughters and four grandchildren. They
carried signs that read THANK GOD FOR
DEAD SOLDIERS, SEMPER Fl FAGS,
and FAG TROOPS.
The members of Westboro Baptist Church
didn't know anything about Matthew, nor
were they claiming that he was gay. They
were simply using his funeral as a vehicle to
spread their message-that God is punishing
the United States for tolerating
homosexuality. The church, which has about
70 members-50 of whom are children,
grandchildren, or in-laws of Phelps-sends
small groups to unrelated events to publicize
their views. And military funerals are a
popular venue.
"It's pretty bad when you go to your son's
funeral and there are pictures of two men
having anal intercourse," Snyder says. "It's
hard enough to bury a 20-year-old soldier,
but to go through this at the same time is
like kicking you in the face while you are
lying on the ground."
Snyder sued the Phelpses for defamation,
intentional infliction of emotional distress,
intrusion, and publication of private facts.
Initially, a jury favored Snyder's position,
awarding him $10 million in damages. (A
trial judge later reduced the amount to $5
million.) But then the Fourth Circuit Court
overturned the lower court's decision on
appeal, ruling that although the speech was
"utterly distasteful," it should be considered
protected political speech.
Snyder wasn't willing to stop there. "As
long as we have military people dying, I will
fight," he says. Now, the U.S. Supreme
Court will hear the case, evaluating whether
the protests should be considered protected
speech under the First Amendment.
It has been difficult for opponents of the
Westboro Church's protests to stop the
Phelpses from spreading their message
because the family is meticulous about
following the law. At trial, it was undisputed
that the family complied with all local
ordinances and police directions. They
contacted the police before picketing and
stayed a specific distance away from the
church. Still, even though every action the
Phelpses have taken has been legal, more
than 40 states and the federal government
have enacted laws in response to limit
protesting at funerals. But Margie Phelps-
daughter of Fred Phelps, and a licensed
attorney who's representing the family in the
case-and her family have successfully
challenged several of these statutes.
Josh Wheeler, associate director of the
Thomas Jefferson Center for the Protection
of Free Expression, says even though the
speech at issue is "repugnant," it still
deserves protection. This isn't an easy
conclusion for Wheeler, especially because
he disagrees with the Phelpses' message-
his brother was gay. "This case [has] tested
me," he says. "But it's important that
Americans have the freedom to express
issues of public concern without the fear of
being sued for $5 million."
Several legal scholars consulted for this
story speculated that the outcome of this
case might shock the general public,
particularly because Snyder's position is
likely to be broadly popular among
Americans. The high court traditionally
supports free-speech arguments, even when
the speech is offensive. "We have to look
beyond the actual speech at issue and focus
on the larger principal-the ability to censor
or prevent the expression of another
individual," Wheeler says.
But the specific facts of this case might be
too extreme for a few of the justices.
"Would it really bother any intelligent
person to say that you can't protest at a
funeral? What's next? They don't like the
Catholic Church, so are they going to protest
a wedding or a baptism?" Snyder says.
Margie Phelps and her family see funerals as
the perfect outlet for their message. "I
remember watching the news, and all of its
pomp and circumstance. These funerals are
a major public platform and no one is telling
the truth," she says.
Although this suit has the ability to curtail
free speech, some legal scholars say it's
worth it. "What the church people want is
the right to make any private individual the
target of their assault. The court would be
creating an incentive for religious speakers
to be abusive [if it ruled in the Phelpses'
favor]," says Jeffrey Schulman, a law
professor at Georgetown University who
drafted an amicus brief in Snyder's favor.
When asked how she would react if
someone were to protest at a funeral of one
of her loved ones, Margie Phelps's response
was immediate: "Do you think I would give
a rat's backside? My focus would 100
percent be, what did I do wrong and how do
I get right with God?" The Phelpses have
picketed about 600 military funerals and
don't plan to stop any time soon, she says.
Snyder's passion is just as intense. Even
though he struggles to pay the legal bills in
the case on his modest, 40-hour-a-week
salary, he won't quit the fight. "As long as
we have two wars going on, I can't stop this.
I won't stop it, because no military family
should be subject to what my family was
subjected to," he says.
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In the annals of strange religious groups, the
Westboro Baptist Church of Topeka,
Kansas, occupies a place of some
distinction. Just 71 strong, its congregants
made their name in the mid-90s by picketing
gay pride rallies and the funerals of Aids
sufferers, waving placards of unbelievable
insensitivity ("Fags Eat Poop", "God Hates
You"). More recently, they've ratcheted up
their ministry of hate by taking the pickets to
the funerals of soldiers killed in Iraq and
Afghanistan ("Fag Military", "Thank God
For Dead Soldiers").
Note these aren't gay dead soldiers (which,
while no less hateful, would at least have a
scintilla of logic). Any soldier's funeral will
do. Their reasoning is that America is so
depraved anyone who fights under her flag
is a "fag enabler", and thus, an enemy of
God.
The Phelps family consider these practises
the true definition of Christian love, proving
that what they lack in compassion they more
than make up for in creative exegesis. For
three weeks, I lived with the Phelps,
attempting to get to know the people
responsible for such a poisonous ministry.
The pastor of the church, and the originator
of the picketing concept, is Fred Phelps.
He's also the patriarch of the family. But
Gramps (as he's known in the family) is
getting on in years, and these days it's his
daughter Shirley who does most of the
organising and the media appearances.
Shirley is in her 40s, a lawyer and mother of
11 children, and she has a kind of genius for
religious invective. Several times I was on
the receiving end of one of her biblical
smackdowns, in which she heaped scriptural
opprobrium on my head, then provided a
graphic account of what it would be like for
me to burn in hell for all eternity. It was a
little like being waterboarded by John the
Baptist.
Naturally part of my regimen was joining
the Phelps on their pickets. These take place
several times daily. As well as soldier's
funerals, they also target local churches,
civic buildings, visiting dignitaries, concerts
by pop bands... In fact, there's almost
nothing that the Phelps can't construe as part
of the general climate of iniquity, and
therefore a legitimate target. One weekly
picket targets a hardware store that sells
Swedish vacuum cleaners.
Apparently, Swedish authorities imprisoned
a local pastor for preaching against
homosexuality, thereby making the whole
nation a target. For the newcomer, these
pickets are bizarre not simply because of the
outrageousness of the signs, but also
because of how they clash with the banality
of the family's interaction. For the Phelps,
it's another day at the office-there's a
watercooler ambience of relaxed chit-chat.
Meanwhile, everyone-even the youngest
children-carries placards saying "Thank
God For 9/11" and "Your Pastor Is A
Whore".
And yet, away from the pickets, they were -
much of the time-very, very normal. Not
just normal, but intelligent and urbane.
They're not hillbillies, they're urban
professionals-several work as lawyers in
Topeka. The young members look like kids
you'd run into at the mall. Weird Christian
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women are supposed to have sallow skin
and dress in headdresses, but the Phelps girls
were all-American, with long hair and good
teeth. They listened to indie bands like the
Killers and the Kooks and could banter
humorously on non-biblical subjects. If
anything, the hostility they've created seems
to have forced them closer together, and,
among themselves at least, they're a warm,
loving family (which explains why the
younger members don't all flee the minute
they can afford a bus ticket).
As for Gramps, I had two interviews with
the man. In my first encounter, I asked him
how many children he had. For some reason
he took exception to this, which set the tone
for the second encounter. This took place in
church one Sunday at the end of one of his
sermons, preached on the subject of
America's coming tribulations. "You're
going to eat your babies!" he bellowed.
Gramps still had the remnant of a folksy,
plain-spoken charm, but the dominant note
in his personality was a bitter contempt for
humanity in general and me specifically. In
an effort to keep the conversation going, I
trotted out some bible quotes I'd memorised
the night before. The interview was over in
about five minutes. It seemed I was a hell-
bound sinner. At least I was in good
company.
Did I make any headway? A little, with the
girls. In challenging circumstances, I
console myself with the thought, expressed
by Friedrich Nietzsche, that "Even when
you lie, you nevertheless tell the truth with
the shape your mouth makes when you are
doing so." Being young and hopped up on
hormones, the junior Phelps couldn't help
telling a story with the shape of their
mouths. One girl appeared to short-circuit
when pressed on the subject of boyfriends,
and later expressed angry bafflement that the
Phelps' "caring" ministrations were so little
appreciated by the locals. Even Shirley
showed signs of empathy on the way to a
soldier's funeral, though she quickly stifled
them with a flight of bible talk.
I found a lot to like about the Phelps. They
have a strong family unit, and Gramps aside,
they were open and hospitable. It was
fascinating to see the power of a family to
create its own bizarre ideology and pass it
down through the generations. But I guess
I'll be seeing you all in hell.
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FISHER, Circuit Judge:
Arizona law grants income tax credits
restricted to taxpayers who make
contributions to nonprofit organizations that
award private school scholarships to
children. Plaintiffs, certain Arizona
taxpayers, allege that some of the
organizations funded under this program
restrict the availability of their scholarships
to religious schools, and that the program in
effect deprives parents, the program's aid
recipients, of a genuine choice between
selecting scholarships to private secular
schools or religious ones. We conclude that
the plaintiffs' complaint, which at this stage
of the litigation we must view in the light
most favorable to the plaintiffs, sufficiently
alleges that Arizona's tax-credit funded
scholarship program lacks religious
neutrality and true private choice in making
scholarships available to parents. Although
scholarship aid is allocated partially through
the individual choices of Arizona taxpayers,
overall the program in practice "carries with
it the imprimatur of government
endorsement." We therefore hold, contrary
to the district court, that plaintiffs'
allegations, if accepted as true, are sufficient
to state a claim that Arizona's private school
scholarship tax credit program, as applied,
violates the Establishment Clause of the
United States Constitution.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs allege that Arizona's Revised
Statute § 43-1089 ("Section 1089"), as
applied, violates the Establishment Clause of
the First Amendment. Section 1089, first
enacted by the Arizona legislature in 1997,
gives individual taxpayers a dollar-for-dollar
tax credit for contributions to "school tuition
organizations" ("STOs"). A STO is a private
nonprofit organization that allocates at least
90 percent of its funds to tuition grants or
scholarships for students enrolled in "a
nongovernmental primary or secondary
school or a preschool for handicapped
students" within the state. STOs may not
provide scholarships to schools that
"discriminate on the basis of race, color,
handicap, familial status or national origin,"
but nothing in the statute precludes STOs
from funding scholarships to schools that
provide religious instruction or that give
admissions preferences on the basis of
religious affiliation. Individual taxpayers
can claim a tax credit of up to $500 for such
contributions and married couples filing
jointly can claim a credit of up to $1,000,
provided the allowable tax credit does not
exceed the taxes otherwise due. Taxpayers
may designate their contribution to a STO
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that agrees to provide a scholarship to
benefit a particular child, so long as the
child is not the taxpayer's own dependent.
The tax credit is available to all taxpayers in
Arizona, regardless of whether they are
parents of school-age children or pay any
private school tuition themselves.
Section 1089 requires STOs to provide
scholarships or tuition grants to children "to
allow them to attend any qualified school of
their parents' choice," but also states that
STOs may not provide scholarships while
"limiting availability to only students of one
school." On its face, then, Section 1089
could have been interpreted to require all
STOs to provide scholarships to any
qualified private school in the state, or to
permit STOs to provide scholarships to a
limited set of schools, so long as that set was
greater than one. In practice, plaintiffs
allege, many STOs have opted to limit the
schools to which they offer scholarships,
and a number of STOs provide scholarships
that may be used only at religious schools or
schools of a particular denomination. For
example, plaintiffs allege that Arizona's
three largest STOs, as measured by the
amount of contributions reported in 1998,
each restricts its scholarships to use at
religious schools. ...
Arizona does not specify scholarship
eligibility criteria or dictate how STOs
choose the students who receive
scholarships, and STO-provided
scholarships therefore vary considerably.
Although STOs may choose to award
scholarships primarily based on financial
need, Section 1089 does not require it. The
availability of scholarships to particular
students and particular schools thus depends
on the amount of funding a STO receives,
the range of schools to which it offers
scholarships and the STO's own scholarship
allocation decisions and eligibility criteria.
Therefore, plaintiffs allege, because the
largest STOs restrict their scholarships to
sectarian schools, students who wish to
attend non-religious private schools are
disadvantaged in terms of the STO-provided
scholarships available to them. Thus,
plaintiffs argue, the disparities in the
availability and amount of scholarships for
use at religious and secular schools show
that the structure of Section 1089, as
applied, favors religious over secular
schools, and thereby violates the
Establishment Clause.
Plaintiffs do not contest the facial
validity of Section 1089, but rather assert
that it violates the Establishment Clause as
applied. The district court dismissed the suit
as barred by the Tax Injunction Act. We
reversed the dismissal and the Supreme
Court affirmed our decision. On remand, the
district court allowed two STOs, the Arizona
Christian School Tuition Organization
("ACSTO") and Arizona School Choice
Trust ("ASCT"), and two parents of ASCT
scholarship recipients, Glenn Dennard and
Luis Moscoso, to intervene as defendants.
ACSTO provides scholarships only to
religious schools and the ASCT provides
scholarships to any private school of the
parents' choice. Defendants again moved to
dismiss, contending that plaintiffs lacked
standing, that the suit was barred by res
judicata and that plaintiffs had failed to state
a claim under the Establishment Clause. The
district court granted defendants' motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim and
plaintiffs appealed. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and we reverse and
remand for further proceedings.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
ANALYSIS
I. Taxpayer Standing
Plaintiffs' only allegation of injury from the
allegedly unconstitutional operation of
Section 1089 arises from their status as
Arizona taxpayers. It is well established that
individuals do not generally have standing to
challenge governmental spending solely
because they are taxpayers, because "it is a
complete fiction to argue that an
unconstitutional federal expenditure causes
an individual federal taxpayer any
measurable economic harm." This rule
applies with equal force to taxpayer suits
challenging an allegedly unconstitutional
state action and those challenging federal
action. The Supreme Court, however, has
long recognized "a narrow exception to the
general constitutional prohibition against
taxpayer standing" when a plaintiff contends
that a use of funds violates the
Establishment Clause. Because plaintiffs
have alleged that the state has used its taxing
and spending power to advance religion in
violation of the Establishment Clause, we
hold that they have standing under Article
III to challenge the application of Section
1089.
Section 1089 gives Arizona taxpayers a tax
credit for amounts they donate to STOs, up
to the statutory cap of $500 for individuals
or $1,000 for married couples filing jointly
or the taxpayers' entire state tax liability.
Tax credits are deducted after taxpayers' tax
liability has been calculated, thereby giving
taxpayers dollar-for-dollar "credits" against
their state taxes for sums paid to STOs. Tax
credits therefore operate differently from tax
deductions; whereas tax deductions allow
taxpayers only to reduce their income
subject to taxation, tax credits allow
individuals to make payments to a third
party in satisfaction of their assessed tax
burden. As the Supreme Court explained,
"[i]n effect, § 43-1089 gives Arizona
taxpayers an election" to direct a portion of
the money they owe the state to either a
STO or to the Arizona Department of
Revenue. Accordingly, "[a]s long as donors
do not give STOs more than their total tax
liability, their... contributions are costless."
Tax credits are therefore a powerful
legislative device for directing money to
private organizations.
Defendant-intervenors argue that plaintiffs
do not have standing to challenge Section
1089 even under the Flast exception,
because the money directed by taxpayers to
STOs under the tax credit program does not
pass through the state treasury and therefore
the program cannot be characterized as
involving any "expenditure" of public funds.
The Supreme Court has recognized,
however, that state tax policies such as tax
deductions, tax exemptions and tax credits
are means of "channeling . . . [state]
assistance" to private organizations, which
can have "an economic effect comparable to
that of aid given directly" to the
organization. . . . In effect, Section 1089
works the same as if the state had given each
taxpayer a $500 check that can only be
endorsed over to a STO or returned to the
state. Because Section 1089 does not allow
taxpayers to keep the money under any
circumstance-and because it directs how
the money will be spent if it is not
surrendered to the state-we reject the
suggestion that this money is not publicly
subsidized simply because it does not pass
through the treasury.
Nor does Section 1089 lack "a sufficient
nexus between the taxpayer's standing as a
taxpayer and the ... [legislative] exercise of
taxing and spending power" just because the
Arizona legislature does not transfer money
to STOs or religious schools directly .... By
giving taxpayers a dollar-for-dollar credit
for contributions to STOs and then requiring
STOs to "allocate[ ] at least ninety percent
of... [their] annual revenue for educational
scholarships or tuition grants to children,"
the state legislature has provided only two
ways for this money to be spent: taxpayers
will either give the dollar to the state, or that
dollar (or at least 90 percent of it, after
allowable STO administrative expenses) will
end up in scholarships for private school
tuition.
Consistent with these principles, the
Supreme Court has repeatedly decided
Establishment Clause challenges brought by
state taxpayers against state tax credit, tax
deduction and tax exemption policies,
without ever suggesting that such taxpayers
lacked Article III standing. The Supreme
Court has also repeatedly decided challenges
brought by state taxpayers to indirect aid
programs-where the ultimate decision to
confer aid rested with a private individual
and not the government-and again never
suggested that taxpayers lacked standing...
We therefore hold that plaintiffs have
standing as taxpayers to challenge Section
1089 for allegedly violating the
Establishment Clause.
I. The Establishment Clause
"The Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment, applied to the States through
the Fourteenth Amendment, prevents a State
from enacting laws that have the 'purpose'
or 'effect' of advancing or inhibiting
religion."
[The court determines that Kotterman v.
Killian, which upheld Section 1089 on a
facial challenge before the statute was
implemented, has no preclusive effect on the
instant as-applied challenge.]
A. Secular Purpose
The first prong of this standard requires us
to consider whether the statute was "enacted
for . . [a] valid secular purpose."
"[A]lithough a legislature's stated reasons
will generally get deference, the secular
purpose required has to be genuine, not a
sham, and not merely secondary to a
religious objective."
The legislative history of Section 1089
shows that its primary sponsor's concern in
introducing the bill was providing equal
access to a wide range of schooling options
for students of every income level by
defraying the costs of educational expenses
incurred by parents. Plaintiffs do not contest
that this purpose, if genuine, is both secular
and valid. Plaintiffs argue, however, that
Section 1089's design and scope reveal this
purpose to be a sham. Specifically, plaintiffs
argue that Section 1089's operation shows
that the program, which provides aid only to
students who attend private schools, was
enacted not to give low-income children a
meaningful opportunity to attend those
schools, but to advance the legislature's
religious aims.
Plaintiffs are correct that the nature of a
program's operation may, in some instances,
reveal its ostensible purpose to be a sham.
As the Court held in McCreary [County, Ky
v. ACLU], the inquiry whether a program's
putative purpose is genuine and "not merely
secondary to a religious objective," is
undertaken from the perspective of "an
.objective observer,' one who takes account
of the traditional external signs that show up
in the 'text, legislative history, and
implementation of the statute,' or
comparable official act." Plaintiffs'
allegations concerning Section 1089's
operation are therefore relevant to whether
the program has a genuine secular purpose.
As we discussed above, for example,
Section 1089 could, on its face, be
interpreted to require each STO to provide
scholarships for use at any qualified private
school, religious or secular. Plaintiffs allege,
however, that in practice STOs are permitted
to restrict the use of their scholarships to use
at certain religious schools. Such
allegations, if proved, could belie
defendants' claim that Section 1089 was
enacted primarily to provide Arizona
students with equal access to a wide range of
schooling options.
At the same time, we are mindful of the
Supreme Court's "reluctance to attribute
unconstitutional motives to the states,
particularly when a plausible secular
purpose for the state's program may be
discerned from the face of the statute." The
Court has held that programs that direct
benefits exclusively to private schools, as
Section 1089 does, may be "adequately
supported by legitimate, nonsectarian
interests," including "promoting pluralism
and diversity among [the state's] public and
nonpublic schools." The question before us,
however, is not whether Section 1089 in fact
has a genuine, secular purpose, but whether
plaintiffs could prove, on the facts alleged in
the complaint, that it does not. Accordingly,
we conclude that plaintiffs' allegations, if
accepted as true, leave open the possibility
that plaintiffs could reveal the legislature's
stated purpose in enacting Section 1089 to
be a pretense.
B. Effect
We next consider whether Section 1089 "has
the forbidden 'effect' of advancing or
inhibiting religion." In "refin[ing] the
definition of governmental action that
unconstitutionally advances religion," the
Supreme Court has "paid particularly close
attention to whether the challenged
governmental practice either has the purpose
or effect of 'endorsing' religion, a concern
that has long had a place in our
Establishment Clause jurisprudence."
Guided by the Court's opinion in Zelman [v.
Simmons-Harris], we conclude, for reasons
set forth below, that plaintiffs have alleged
facts sufficient to state an as-applied
Establishment Clause claim under this
endorsement test.
Section 1089 is an indirect aid program,
under which the state gives tax credits to
individuals who contribute to STOs, which
in turn use the money to provide private
school scholarships. Plaintiffs allege that
many of these STOs in fact exist to promote
the funding of religious education. If the
state of Arizona were to allocate funds
directly to these religious STOs, the state
would plainly violate the Establishment
Clause. As defendants correctly argue,
however, STOs are private charitable
organizations-albeit funded by taxpayer
contributions that the state will reimburse
through dollar-for-dollar tax credits.
We nevertheless hold that if plaintiffs'
allegations are accepted as true, Section
1089 violates the Establishment Clause by
delegating to taxpayers a choice that, from
the perspective of the program's aid
recipients, "deliberately skew[s] incentives
toward religious schools." In practice,
plaintiffs allege, the choice delegated to
taxpayers under Section 1089 channels a
disproportionate amount of government aid
to sectarian STOs, which in turn limit their
scholarships to use at religious schools. The
scholarship program thus skews aid in favor
of religious schools, requiring parents who
would prefer a secular private school but
who cannot obtain aid from the few
available nonsectarian STOs to choose a
religious school to obtain the perceived
benefits of a private school education.
Accordingly, Section 1089's delegation to
taxpayers operates to deprive these parents,
as the program's aid recipients, of
"genuinely independent and private choices"
to direct the program aid to secular schools.
Unlike indirect aid programs the Supreme
Court has upheld, Section 1089 is not a
"neutral program of private choice," and a
reasonable observer could therefore
conclude that the aid reaching religious
schools under this program "carries with it
the imprimatur of government
endorsement."
Defendants dispute this conclusion on two
grounds: First, that as private institutions
who do not receive direct government
funding, they are no different from other
nonprofit, religious institutions that are
funded through tax-deductible contributions.
Second, that under the program,
"government aid reaches religious schools
only as a result of the genuine and
independent choices of private individuals."
We address each of these arguments in turn.
1. Aid to Private Institutions
Defendants first argue that because STOs do
not receive direct government funding,
Section 1089 is no different from other
programs that accord tax benefits to
individuals who contribute to nonprofit,
religious institutions. As with any program
of government aid, however, whether such
programs violate the Establishment Clause
depends on whether they have "either . . .
the purpose or effect of 'endorsing'
religion." The parallels defendants contend
exist between Section 1089 and tax
deduction programs that the Supreme Court
has held "easily pass[ ] constitutional
muster" are therefore instructive, but only to
the extent they shed light on the secular
objectives, if any, that Section 1089 was
enacted to promote.
The secular objectives defendants argue
Section 1089 promotes differ significantly
from those advanced by tax deduction
programs the Supreme Court has upheld.
The federal system addressed in Hernandez
[v. Comm'r], for example, permits tax
deductions for "any charitable contribution"
to a qualified entity "organized and operated
exclusively for religious, charitable,
scientific, literary, or educational purposes,
or to foster national or international amateur
sports competition." This system, the Court
held, makes deductions available for
contributions to an array of religious and
secular organizations, and thus has "the
primary effect of . . . encouraging gifts to
charitable entities, including but not limited
to religious organizations." Section 1089, by
contrast, offers narrowly targeted, dollar-for-
dollar tax credits designed to fully reimburse
contributions to STOs, most of which
restrict recipients' choices about how to use
their scholarships. Although defendants
contend these credits were enacted to
provide Arizona schoolchildren equal access
to a wide range of schooling options,
defendants do not-and could not-suggest
the credits are designed to promote
donations of individual wealth or charitable
giving to a broad array of institutions.
Likewise, defendants do not suggest that
Section 1089 has a secular purpose in
common with laws granting tax exemptions
to a broad range of nonprofit organizations,
including churches. Thus, we are not
persuaded that Section 1089 conforms with
the Establishment Clause simply because it
bears some superficial resemblance to
programs that do.
2. Private Choice
The Supreme Court has "drawn a consistent
distinction between government programs
that provide aid directly to religious schools,
and programs of true private choice, in
which government aid reaches religious
schools only as a result of the genuine and
independent choices of private individuals."
Defendants argue that Section 1089, like
other religiously neutral educational
assistance programs the Supreme Court has
found constitutional, is a "program of true
private choice . . . and [is] thus
constitutional."
The nature of the choices provided under
Section 1089, however, differs significantly
in structure from those under educational
assistance programs the Court has held to be
"programs of true private choice." In each of
those programs, the government "provid[ed]
assistance directly" to parents or individual
students, "who, in tram, direct[ed] the
government aid to religious schools wholly
as a result of their own genuine and
independent private choice." Under the
voucher program upheld in Zelman, for
example, the state distributed tuition aid
directly to eligible parents, who were free to
use the aid to send their children to any
participating public or private school, and
those wishing their children to remain
enrolled in public school received tutorial
aid to accommodate that choice.
Under Section 1089, by contrast, the state
does not provide aid directly to parents.
Instead the aid is mediated first through
taxpayers, and then through private
scholarship programs. Under Section 1089,
all Arizona taxpayers are eligible for a
tuition tax credit, and those whose tax
liability is large enough to use the credit
may apply it toward a contribution to any
STO, regardless of whether that STO
provides scholarships exclusively for use at
religious schools. In turn, any Arizona
parent who wishes to send her child to a
private school may apply for a STO
scholarship, provided that the child meets
the STO's eligibility criteria for the use of
that scholarship.
Unlike parents' choices under the program
in Zelman, or aid recipients' choices under
other programs the Court has upheld,
parents' choices are constrained by those of
the taxpayers exercising the discretion
granted by Section 1089. . . . Thus, it is
taxpayers who decide which STOs to fund
and, consequently, who is eligible to receive
STO-provided scholarships according to the
criteria of the designated STO.
Defendants acknowledge the differences
between parents' choices under Section
1089 and those afforded under indirect aid
programs that the Supreme Court has
previously upheld. They contend, however,
that because Section 1089 offers "genuine
and independent choices" to the taxpayers
who fund STOs, these differences are
irrelevant to whether Section 1089 violates
the Establishment Clause. We disagree.
a. Parental choice
The parties do not contest that
notwithstanding its structural differences
from indirect aid programs the Court has
upheld, Section 1089 would satisfy the
Establishment Clause if the program made
scholarships available to parents on a
religiously neutral basis and gave them a
true private choice as to where to utilize the
scholarships. Plaintiffs allege, however, this
is not how the program works in practice. In
Zelman, the Court identified several
circumstances relevant to whether the
indirect aid program at issue, which gave
tuition grants to parents to apply toward
private and fee-charging public schools, was
"a program of true private choice . . . and
thus constitutional. . .
Under this rubric, Section 1089 falls short.
The vast majority of the scholarship money
under the program--over 85 percent as of
the time of plaintiffs' complaint-is
available only for use at religious schools.
Because this aid is available only to parents
who are willing to send their children to a
religious school, the program fails to
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"confer[ ] educational assistance directly to
a broad class of individuals defined without
reference to religion." Moreover, because a
disproportionate amount of the program aid
is earmarked for use at religious schools
before parents receive the aid, Section 1089
is not, from the parents' perspective,
"neutral in all respects toward religion" and
does not equally "permit[] the participation
of all schools . . . religious or nonreligious"
in the program. Additionally, because
Section 1089 does not make aid equally
available to parents "on the basis of neutral,
secular criteria that neither favor nor
disfavor religion," the program creates
"financial incentive[s]" for parents that
"'ske[w]' the program toward religious
schools." Thus, parents who wish to place
their children in a private secular school, but
who could not otherwise afford to do so, are
at a disadvantage compared to parents who
are willing to accept a scholarship for
private religious schooling-either by
choice or out of financial necessity.
Although parents would, of course, have the
option of leaving their children in public
school, we reject the suggestion that the
mere existence of the public school system
guarantees that any scholarship program
provides for genuine private choice. For
parents wait-listed for scholarships to
secular schools, the range of educational
choices the STO-administered scholarship
programs offer do not realistically include
"obtain[ing] a scholarship and choos[ing] a
nonreligious private school." Section 1089,
as applied, thereby creates incentives that
pressure these parents into accepting one of
the scholarships that are readily available
under the program for use at a religious
school. Therefore, Section 1089, as applied,
"fails to provide genuine opportunities for..
parents to select secular educational
options for their school-age children."
b. Taxpayer choice
Defendants argue that despite this failure,
Section 1089 does not violate the
Establishment Clause because it provides a
tax credit to all Arizona taxpayers, without
respect to religion, and gives taxpayers a
genuine choice between directing their
money to religious or secular STOs.
Therefore, as Zelman requires, "government
aid reaches religious schools only as a result
of the genuine and independent choices of
private individuals." Plaintiffs do not contest
that Section 1089 is neutral with respect to
the taxpayers who direct money to STOs, or
that any of the program's aid that reaches a
STO does so only as a result of the genuine
and independent choice of an Arizona
taxpayer. Plaintiffs argue, however, that
Section 1089 violates the Establishment
Clause precisely because the individual
taxpayers' choices available under the
program serve to restrict parents'
opportunities to select secular educational
options for their school-age children,
skewing parents' incentives to send their
children to religious schools. As such, the
program is not "neutral in all respects
toward religion" and, concomitantly, is not a
"program of true private choice."
Defendants argue that it is irrelevant, under
Zelman, whether an indirect aid program
offers true private choice to parents, or
instead, like Section 1089, offers true private
choice to another broadly defined class of
individuals. In describing what constitutes
"true private choice," however, the Court in
Zelman frequently emphasized that the
choice is one offered, on a neutral basis, to
parents or students, as the beneficiaries of
the program's aid. Defendants contend this
emphasis is simply because parental choice
was the only private choice offered under
those programs.
Defendants' argument, however, disregards
the Court's analysis of how the true private
choice described in Zelman ensures that
government aid flowing to religious
institutions does not have "the forbidden
'effect' of advancing . . . religion' even
though the aid would have such an effect
under a program of direct funding. The
function of true private choice, the Court
explained, is to eliminate the perception that
the government is endorsing religion
through the money that is channeled to
sectarian institutions: "The incidental
advancement of a religious mission, or the
perceived endorsement of a religious
message, is reasonably attributable to the
individual recipient, not to the government,
whose role ends with the disbursement of
benefits." The Court expressly linked its
"true private choice" analysis to the
"reasonable observer" inquiry as to whether
the government is perceived to endorse the
religious organizations that benefit from its
aid.
In drawing this link, the Court adopted
Justice O'Connor's position in Mitchell v.
Helms that "[i]n terms of public perception,
a government program of direct aid to
religious schools . . . differs meaningfully
from the government distributing aid
directly to individual students who, in turn,
decide to use the aid at the same religious
schools." Under this framework, the
question central to the endorsement inquiry
is whether "the reasonable observer would
naturally perceive the aid program [in
question] as government support for the
advancement of religion." ". [T]he
reasonable observer in th[is] endorsement
inquiry must be deemed aware' of the
'history and context' underlying a
challenged program." We impute this
knowledge to the reasonable observer
because "the endorsement inquiry is not
about the perceptions of particular
individuals or saving isolated nonadherents
from . . . discomfort," but instead concerns
"the political community writ large."
Accordingly, to assess whether the taxpayer
choice offered under Section 1089 has the
same constitutional effect as the parental
choice Zelman upheld, we must consider the
Court's application of the reasonable
observer inquiry to the program at issue in
that case. Specifically, we must consider the
circumstances the Court deemed relevant to
why a reasonable, informed observer looking
at the program upheld in Zelman would
conclude that "[tihe incidental advancement
of a religious mission, or the perceived
endorsement of a religious message"
resulting from a program "is reasonably
attributable to the individual recipient, not to
the government, whose role ends with the
disbursement of benefits." The Court's
guidance in earlier cases also sheds light on
two circumstances that seemed particularly
important to the reasonable observer
analysis in Zelman.
First, a reasonable, informed observer would
consider what role the person making the
choice occupies in the structure of the
program. In Larkin [v. Grendel's Den, Inc.],
the Court determined there was no "effective
means of guaranteeing" the veto power
delegated to churches over liquor licenses
"[would] be used exclusively for secular,
neutral, and nonideological purposes." "In
addition," the Court continued, "the mere
appearance of a joint exercise of legislative
authority by Church and State provides a
significant symbolic benefit to religion in
the minds of some by reason of the power
conferred." Of course, the delegation of
scholarship funding to individual taxpayers,
such as in Section 1089, does less to
promote religion than the delegation of
zoning authority to churches. Larkin's
holding, however, illustrates that when a
statute delegates "a power ordinarily vested
in agencies of government" to a private
party without reasonable assurance that the
party's choices will advance the secular
purposes of the statute, any ensuing
"perceived endorsement of a religious
message" may be "reasonably attribut[ed]"
to the government.
By contrast, the educational assistance
programs addressed in Zelman were
structured so that parents were permitted to
choose how to best use the program aid to
assist their children. The parents' decisive
role in the program gave them incentives to
apply the program's aid based on their
children's educational interests instead of on
sectarian considerations, such as whether to
promote the religious mission of a particular
school. Accordingly, by delegating a choice
that "ensured that parents were the ones to
select a religious school as the best learning
environment" for their children, the
government did not appear to endorse
religion.
Second, a reasonable, informed observer
would consider whether the choice
delegated under a program has the effect of
promoting, or hindering, the program's
secular purpose. In Larkin, the Court
recognized that the statute delegating veto
power to churches and schools had the valid
secular purpose of "protect[ing] spiritual,
cultural, and educational centers from the
'hurly-burly' associated with liquor outlets."
The Court noted, however, that "these valid
secular objectives can be readily
accomplished by other means" and that the
veto power conferred by the statute could
"be used by churches to promote goals
beyond insulating the church from
undesirable neighbors." The Court
concluded that the delegation could "be seen
as having a 'primary' and 'principal' effect
of advancing religion." Similarly, in [Comm.
for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v.]
Nyquist, the Court invalidated a program
providing tuition grants and tax credits to
parents sending their children to private
schools because, although the program had a
valid secular purpose, "the effect of the aid
[wa]s unmistakably to provide desired
financial support for nonpublic, sectarian
institutions." Nyquist illustrates that if an
educational assistance program provides
individual choice through tax credits, but
those tax credits hinder the program's ability
to achieve its valid secular goals, a
reasonable observer could well conclude
that the tax credits are simply masking an
Establishment Clause violation.
The choices delegated to parents under
Zelman, by contrast, may have advanced-
and at least did not thwart-the secular
purpose of the program, which was to
"provid[e] educational assistance to poor
children in a demonstrably failing public
school system." The best educational
environment for a particular child within a
failed school system may depend on
qualitative considerations that could not
easily be assessed at a policymaking level.
The choice offered under the program may
have therefore helped ensure that the
program achieved its secular aims by
delegating funding decisions to a class of
persons-parents-who were better
positioned than a state policymaking body to
make educational choices for individual
students in a failing school system.
Drawing upon these two circumstances-the
role the person making the choice occupies
in the structure of a program and whether
delegating the choice promotes the secular
purpose of the program-we turn to
defendants' argument that the individual,
taxpayer choice provided under Section
1089 necessarily has the same constitutional
effect as the parental choice upheld in
Zelman. Under Section 1089, individual
taxpayers may constrain the scholarship
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options of other parents' children by
choosing to direct their state-reimbursed
contributions to sectarian STOs. Yet unlike
parents, whose choices directly affect their
children, taxpayers have no structural
incentives under Section 1089 to direct their
contributions primarily for secular reasons,
such as the academic caliber of the schools
to which a STO restricts aid, rather than for
sectarian reasons, such as the religious
mission of a particular STO. Thus, the
taxpayers' position in the structure of
Section 1089 provides no "'effective means
of guaranteeing' that taxpayers will refrain
from using the program for sectarian
purposes. Significantly, plaintiffs'
allegations suggest the taxpayers' role in the
structure of Section 1089, as applied,
encourages them to use the tax credits to
promote sectarian goals, and that taxpayers
have in fact used the program aid to this end.
Relatedly, the taxpayer choice provided
under Section 1089 does little to advance-
indeed, it appears to thwart-the secular
purpose of the program, which is to provide
equal access to a wide range of schooling
options for students of every income level
by defraying the costs of educational
expenses incurred by parents. Defendants do
not suggest taxpayers are better positioned
than government administrators to allocate
program aid in a manner that will expand
schooling options, and plaintiffs' allegations
suggest the demand for STO-provided
scholarships available for use at secular
schools markedly outstrips their supply. This
misalignment between parents' interests and
taxpayers' desires suggests that by vesting
individual taxpayers with funding authority,
Section 1089's design works against its
purpose of providing Arizona students with
equal access to a wide range of schooling
options. Although Section 1089 leaves
individual parents free to create new STOs
that cater to their educational preferences,
this freedom provides little benefit to parents
who do not have the time or capital to get
others to support their STO, given that these
parents cannot use their tax credits to fund
scholarships for their own children.
Accordingly, we conclude that there is a
meaningful constitutional distinction
between the individual, taxpayer choice
provided under Section 1089 and the
parental choice upheld in Zelman. Section
1089, as claimed to operate in practice, is
not a program of true private choice,
immune from further constitutional scrutiny.
We therefore hold that plaintiffs have
alleged facts upon which a reasonable,
informed observer could conclude that
Section 1089, as applied, violates the
Establishment Clause even though the state
does not directly decide whether any
particular sectarian organizations will
receive program aid.
The district court's order dismissing
plaintiffs' complaint is reversed and
remanded for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
REVERSED and REMANDED for
further proceedings.
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"High Court to Hear Arizona School Case"
The Associated Press
May 24, 2010
Paul Davenport
The U.S. Supreme Court will consider
ending a lawsuit that challenges Arizona's
tax breaks for donations for thousands of
private school scholarships.
The Washington-based court on Monday
said it will hear two appeals filed by the
state and supporters of the 13-year-old
program that provides dollar-for-dollar state
income tax breaks for donations to school
tuition organizations.
The action "is terrific news for the
thousands of families who desperately need
scholarship assistance to send their children
to the school of their choice," said Tim
Keller, executive director of the Institute for
Justice's Arizona chapter.
The institute was one of several groups
defending the program.
A lawyer for the challengers said he hopes
the justices' action doesn't mean the
Supreme Court intends to open the door for
broad state funding of religious instruction.
"I hope they didn't take this case to say
that," said attorney Paul Bender.
The American Civil Liberties Union and
others challenged the program as
unconstitutional because religious
organizations award most of the
scholarships and require children to enroll in
religious schools. The suit says the program
amounts to an unconstitutional state
endorsement of religion.
The Arizona Supreme Court previously
upheld the constitutionality of the 1997 law
as written, but the current case being
considered by federal courts challenges how
the program has been implemented.
A U.S. District Court judge dismissed the
current case, but the federal appeals court in
San Francisco last year ruled that the lawsuit
could proceed. In that ruling, a 9th U.S.
Circuit Court of Appeals panel said the
program could be unconstitutional because
parents seeking scholarships didn't have a
realistic range of education choices for
students to attend nonreligious schools.
In 2002, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld
school voucher programs. Supporters of the
Arizona aid program say it is no different
from the Cleveland program upheld in 2002
because in both cases, government does not
direct any money to religious schools.
The court will hear arguments in the fall on
the two cases it consolidated into one
appeal.
The state Department of Revenue said in an
April report that 73,391 donations totaling
$50.8 million were reported for 2009.
School tuition organization groups reported
providing 27,582 scholarships totaling $52.1
million for students attending 370 private
schools in the same year, the department
said.
Other states with versions of tuition tax
credit programs include Florida, Georgia,
Iowa, Pennsylvania and Rhode Island.
Lawrence C. Mohrweis, a Northern Arizona
University accounting professor who has
studied tuition tax credit programs, said
those states other than Florida share features
with Arizona's program that could make
them vulnerable to constitutional challenges.
The two cases being consolidated into one
appeal are Arizona Christian School
Tuition Organization v. Winn, 09-987, and
Garriott v. Winn, 09-991.
"Slow Learners at the 9th Circuit"
The Washington Post
Mar 19, 2010
George F. Will
The 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals is a
stimulus package for the Supreme Court,
which would rather not have one. The 9th
Circuit, often in error but never in doubt,
provides the Supreme Court with steady
work: Over the past half-century, the 9th has
been reversed almost 11 times per Supreme
Court term, more than any other circuit
court. This week, the Supreme Court should
spank it again and ask: Is it too much to ask
that you pay some attention to our
precedents?
On Thursday at 9:30 a.m., the justices are
expected to meet to decide whether to
dignify the 9th's latest misadventure-an
impertinence, actually-with a full hearing,
including additional briefing and oral
arguments, or whether to summarily reverse
it. They should do the latter by 9:35 a.m.
The case[, Arizona Christian School
Tuition Organization v. Winn and Garriott
v. Winn,] concerns an Arizona school choice
program that has been serving low- and
middle-income families for 13 years. The
state grants a tax credit to individuals who
donate to nonprofit entities that award
scholarships for children to attend private
schools-including religious schools. Yes,
here we go again.
The question-if a question that has been
redundantly answered remains a real
question-is whether this violates the First
Amendment proscription of any measure
amounting to government "establishment of
religion." The incorrigible 9th Circuit has
declared Arizona's program
unconstitutional, even though there is no
government involvement in any parent's
decision to use a scholarship at a religious
school.
Surely this question was settled eight years
ago in a decision that was the seventh
consecutive defeat for the disgustingly
determined people who are implacably
opposed to any policies that enable parents
who are not affluent to exercise the right of
school choice that is routinely exercised by
more fortunate Americans. It sometimes
takes time for news of the outside world to
penetrate San Francisco, where the 9th
Circuit is headquartered, but surely by now
that court has heard that in 2002, in a case
coming from Cleveland, the Supreme Court
upheld a program quite like Arizona's but
arguably more problematic.
It was created after Cleveland's school
district flunked 27-out of 27-standards
measuring student performance, and the
state declared the district an "academic
emergency." The program empowered
parents to redeem publicly funded vouchers
at religious as well as nonreligious private
schools.
In an opinion written by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and joined by Justices O'Connor,
Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas, the court held
that Cleveland's program has the "valid
secular purpose" of helping children who are
trapped in the failing schools for which
Cleveland is responsible. The court also held
that the program satisfied the court's
previously enunciated standard of "true
private choice" because government aid
goes directly to parents, who use it at their
unfettered discretion.
So, Rehnquist wrote, public money "reaches
religious schools only as a result of the
genuine and independent choices of private
individuals." Therefore any "advancement
of a religious mission" is merely
"incidental" and confers "no imprimatur of
state approval ... on any particular religion,
or on religion generally." These standards
had been developed in various prior cases.
The Supreme Court has been splitting and
re-splitting constitutional hairs about this for
decades, holding, for example, that it is
constitutional for public funds to provide
parochial school pupils with transportation
to classes-but not to field trips. To provide
parochial schools with nurses-but not
guidance counselors. To provide religious
schools with books-but not maps. This last
split hair caused the late Sen. Pat Moynihan
to wonder: What about atlases, which are
books of maps?
The court has ruled that public funds can
provide a sign language interpreter to a deaf
child at a religious school and can provide
rehabilitation assistance at a religious
college. The court has held that a state can
offer tax deductions to parents paying tuition
to religious schools. Can the 9th Circuit see
a pattern here?
Scores of thousands of children have
benefited from Arizona's scholarship
program, which, unlike Cleveland's, does
not involve any government funds that
might otherwise go to public schools.
Rather, Arizona's program infuses
substantial additional funds into the state's
K-through-12 educational offerings.
Democracy demands patience. In its
political discourse, repetition is required
because persuasion takes time. But the
Supreme Court should not have to cajole
lower courts into acknowledging its rulings.
This term, the court has issued 11 summary
reversals. Thursday morning it should use its
12th on the 9th Circuit, a slow learner.
"Supreme Court to Weigh Arizona
Tuition Tax Credits"
Education Week
Mar 25, 2010
Mark Walsh
In a move welcomed by school choice
supporters, the U.S. Supreme Court has
agreed to weigh the constitutionality of a 13-
year-old Arizona program offering tax
credits for donations made to organizations
that provide scholarships for children to
attend private schools.
The case accepted May 24 involves a ruling
by a federal appeals court last year that
Arizona's tax-credit program is likely to
impermissibly advance religion in violation
of the First Amendment's prohibition
against any government establishment of
religion.
A three-judge panel of the U.S, Court of
Appeals for the 9th Circuit, in San
Francisco, in an April 2009 opinion found
that the majority of those Arizona
scholarships go to students attending
religious schools, and that some of the
"school tuition organizations," or STOs,
restrict their scholarships to that purpose.
"We conclude that the plaintiffs' complaint.
• . sufficiently alleges that Arizona's tax-
credit-funded scholarship program lacks
religious neutrality and true private choice in
making scholarships available to parents,"
the panel said.
The court said the program could be
distinguished from the Ohio private-school-
voucher program upheld by the U.S.
Supreme Court in 2002 in Zelman v.
Simmons-Harris.
The state of Arizona and two groups that
provide scholarships under that state's
program appealed to the U.S. Supreme
Court, which granted two of the three
petitions for review-Arizona Christian
School Tuition Organization v. Winn (Case
No. 09-987) and Garriott v. Winn (No. 09-
991). The court put the third appeal aside for
now.
Andrew R. Campanella, a spokesman for the
Alliance for School Choice, a Washington-
based advocacy organization, is hoping the
Supreme Court will overturn the 9th Circuit
ruling, saying the Arizona program provides
a "free open market for opportunities,"
because taxpayers decide to which
scholarship organizations they want to give
their money.
"Many that provide scholarships go to
nonreligious schools," Mr. Campanella said.
Clint Bolick, the litigation director at the
Goldwater Institute, a think tank based in
Phoenix that is supportive of the state tax-
credit program, said it should be easy for the
Supreme Court justices to decide to uphold
the program, because a ruling in 1983, in
Mueller v. Allen, sets a precedent for them to
do so.
In that case, Mr. Bolick said, Minnesota
taxpayers received state tax deductions for
private school tuition of their own children,
and 97 percent of the funds were going to
religious schools. With the Arizona
program, he said, "the relationship between
the state and religious schools is even less
direct because the state is providing credits
for people who are contributing scholarships
for other children."
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However, Kevin G. Welner, a professor and
the director of the Education and the Public
Interest Center at the University of Colorado
at Boulder, said that Arizona's tax-credit
program is very different from conventional
voucher systems like the one that the
Supreme Court upheld in 2002.
Mr. Weiner, who has voiced concern about
tax-credit programs, said that instead of a
state having created a neutral system that
permits parents to select from participating
private schools, whether religious or secular,
Arizona has created a system that "tells
wealthier taxpayers that they can choose
which private schools will be available to
parents."
"The key question framed for the court is
whether the state can effectively delegate to
its wealthier taxpayers a decision process
that, as applied, favors some religious
institutions over others," Mr. Welner said in
an e-mail.
Push for Review
Although the full 9th Circuit court declined
in October to rehear the Arizona case, eight
members of that court dissented, with U.S.
Circuit Judge Diarmuid F. O'Scannlain
saying, "The panel's holding casts a pall
over comparable educational tax-credit
schemes in states across the nation."
Eight states filed a friend-of-court brief on
the side of Arizona urging the Supreme
Court to take the case, arguing that the 9th
Circuit panel's ruling raises doubts about
tuition tax credits elsewhere.
The eight-Florida, Indiana, Louisiana,
Michigan, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, and Utah-argue that "promoting
charitable giving through tax incentives is an
efficient and legitimate way to achieve the
states' goal of improving the quality and
accessibility of private schools."
The appeal from Arizona points out that the
state's program was enacted in 1997 and has
been upheld under the federal Constitution
by the Arizona Supreme Court. Taxpayers
can receive a dollar-for-dollar credit of up to
$500 (or $1,000 for married couples) for
donations to school tuition organizations.
The STOs must spend at least 90 percent of
their annual revenues on scholarships or
tuition grants. The organizations may not
limit their grants to a single school, but they
may limit them to religious schools, as
several of the groups do.
The Arizona Department of Revenue said in
an April report that 73,391 donations
totaling $50.8 million were reported for
2009. School tuition organizations reported
providing 27,582 scholarships totaling $52.1
million for students attending 370 private
schools in the same year, the department
said.
The appeal by the Arizona Christian School
Tuition Organization argues that under the
tax-credit program, "the private choices of
taxpayers, the STOs, and parents direct
tuition funds to students. The taxpayer
chooses to donate or not, and if he donates,
to which STO. The privately formed,
nonprofit STOs raise money to award
scholarships to schools of their choice."
But a brief filed on behalf of the taxpayers
who challenged the tax credits argues that
the Arizona program uniquely relies on
religious organizations to award most of the
scholarships, and it permits those
organizations to require parents to enroll
their children in religious schools.
"The Arizona program is neither based on
financial or academic need nor neutral with
respect to religion," said the taxpayers'
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brief. "Instead, it awards most of its
scholarships to the children of middle-class
and wealthy parents on the basis of
religion."
The Arizona case has been to the U.S.
Supreme Court once before, on a narrow
question of whether federal courts were
barred from hearing such challenges to a
state tax law under a 1937 federal law, the
Tax Injunction Act. In 2004, in Hibbs v.
Winn, the justices ruled 5-4 that the federal
law did not bar the suit as federal courts had
heard challenges to tax breaks for private
school tuition going back for roughly 50
years. ("Justices Allow Suit Challenging
Tax Credits," June 23, 2004.)
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"U.S. Supreme Court to Weigh Arizona's
Tax Credit Law"
The Arizona Republic
Mar 25, 2010
Pat Kossan & Ronald J. Hansen
The U.S. Supreme Court on Monday agreed
to review the constitutionality of an Arizona
program that diverts state tax revenue into
private-school scholarships [in Arizona
Christian School Tuition Organization v.
Winn, 09-987, and Garriott v. Winn, 09-
991].
The court's acceptance of the case may bode
well for the tuition tax-credit program, some
legal experts said, because a majority of
Supreme Court justices have ruled in favor
of programs that provide parents with public
money to help pay for tuition at private
schools.
If that trend continues, the court could
declare Arizona's program constitutional,
ending a decade long court battle in the
state's federal courts. Or it could send the
original lawsuit back to be heard in a lower
court if it agrees that constitutional questions
exist.
The Supreme Court will review the case in
the fall, and a decision is expected before
next spring.
Opponents of the tax-credit program say the
high court could still rule against Arizona's
law because, unlike other school-choice
programs, it distributes most of the money to
students at religious schools through
organizations linked to religious schools.
Arizona's private-school tuition tax-credit
program gives donors a dollar-for-dollar
reduction in state income taxes for annual
contributions of up to $1,000. Non-profit
organizations called school-tuition
organizations collect the money and
distribute it in the form of scholarships.
Many school-tuition organizations are
closely linked to a certain religion and give
the majority of scholarships to schools tied
to that faith or denomination.
An analysis of 2008 scholarships by The
Arizona Republic found that religious
schools received 93 percent of the $54
million collected by school-tuition
organizations that year. In 2009, at least 91.5
percent of $52 million collected went to
religious schools.
Pros and cons
At issue for the court is the way Arizona's
tuition tax-credit program is carried out.
Opponents say the reality of the program is
that it redirects public tax money to private,
mostly religious organizations and schools,
which is unconstitutional.
They were buoyed by rulings last year by
the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, which
said the state's program may not meet the
criteria for more secular tuition tax-credit
programs already approved as constitutional
by the U.S. Supreme Court. The 9th Circuit
returned the program to the U.S. District
Court for a full hearing, but the Supreme
Court stepped in on Monday to take up the
case.
"Most of the money in Arizona is awarded
by school-tuition organizations affiliated
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with religious schools and is usable only at
religious schools," attorney Paul Bender
said.
The school-choice programs that the
Supreme Court has ruled as constitutional
were religiously neutral, said Bender, former
dean of the Arizona State University law
school and lead attorney for the American
Civil Liberties Union, one of the advocacy
groups opposing the tax-credit program.
In Ohio, for example, the Supreme Court in
2002 approved a voucher program in which
the state distributes tax money to needy
parents and the parents can use the money to
send their child to any private school.
"The Arizona school program is religious-
specific," Bender said. "You have a thumb
on the scale to push the parents to send their
kid to a religious school."
Supporters of the tuition tax-credit program
say the tax money does not go directly to
private and religious schools. Instead,
donors can contribute to a variety of private-
school-tuition organizations, including some
secular ones, and parents decide which
schools their child attends, said Jeremy
Tedesco, an attorney with the Alliance
Defense Fund, a Christian legal group that is
helping defend the Arizona program.
"It's, 'This is where I want my money to go,
and this is where I want my child to attend
school,"' Tedesco said. "You also have
private organizations dispensing the
money."
This type of program will give the Supreme
Court a chance to solidify its support of
school-choice programs in other states,
Tedesco said.
How we got here
Alan Brownstein, a constitutional-law
professor at the University of California-
Davis, said retired Supreme Court Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor was the swing vote in
church-state cases in years past. Her
replacement, Samuel Alito, seems more
inclined to support government aid for
religious organizations, he said.
The current court seems "very favorable"
toward indirect-aid programs, Brownstein
said.
Arizona's program seems to fit that
description. The tax credits go to donors, not
churches or private schools. Also, donations
go to school-tuition organizations, a third
party that must by state law give to more
than one school.
One factor that likely influenced the
Supreme Court was a strong dissent by eight
of the 27 judges on the 9th Circuit. The
dissenters said that the scholarship money
reaches religious schools only because many
taxpayers make individual decisions and that
the state does not encourage individuals to
give direct aid to religious schools.
Bender acknowledged that "it would have
been close to a miracle" if the Supreme
Court had ignored that dissent.
But "I'm hopeful we can get the Supreme
Court to be clear and say, 'Look, you cannot
let religious organizations take tax revenue
and distribute it on the basis of religion and
tell parents you can only use it to send the
kid to a religious school,"' he said.
"Big New Establishment Clause Case, on Religious
Groups' Participating in Evenhanded
Government Funding Programs"
The Volokh Conspiracy
May 24, 2010
Eugene Volokh
The Supreme Court just agreed to hear
Arizona Christian School Tuition
Organization v. Winn and Garriott v. Winn,
which are the latest cases to deal with the
question: When may religious institutions-
here, schools-participate in government
funding programs that are equally open to
secular institutions and religious institutions
(or, as here, to groups that pay for tuition at
secular schools and groups that pay for
tuition at religious schools)?
I think the answer is that such programs
should almost always be constitutional,
regardless of what fraction of the money
ends up going to religious schools. That's
true whether the programs are the GI Bill
(which funded veterans' college education,
whether at religious universities or secular
universities), a funding system for
vocational training for the blind (which
included training for would-be ministers as
well as for other trades and professions), the
school choice program in Zelman v.
Simmons-Harris, or the tax credit system at
issue in this case, where taxpayers can get a
tax credit for contributing to scholarship-
giving organizations, regardless of whether
the organizations chosen by the taxpayers
give scholarships only for religious schools,
only for secular schools, or for a mix of
religious and secular schools. I discuss this
in considerably more detail in my Equal
Treatment Is Not Establishment article.
But in any event, the Court's decision here
may be pretty significant, and may
strengthen the Zelman principle to make
clear that these sorts of programs are indeed
constitutional. Justice O'Connor joined the
Zelman majority, but wrote a concurrence
that could be read as expressing a somewhat
narrower position than the majority's, and
took a different view from Justices
Rehnquist, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas in
the related field of evenhanded per-capita
aid programs. I suspect that Chief Justice
Roberts is at least as supportive of religious
groups' participation in a wide range of
evenhanded funding programs as Chief
Justice Rehnquist was, and that Justice Alito
is more supportive of it than Justice
O'Connor was. So unless the case is decided
on standing grounds, I expect the opinion to
be a pretty solid win for the Arizona
program and for other such programs more
generally (so long as they are legally equally
open to secular and religious institutions).
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"An Appealing School Choice"
The Washington Post
May 20, 2010
Eric Robinson
Most people know when the U.S. Supreme
Court issues a ruling, it is considered the
final say for that case. Unfortunately, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
has tried to overstep the Supreme Court in
no less than four cases dealing with parental
choice in education.
In direct conflict with Supreme Court
precedent and to the detriment of more than
28,000 Arizona schoolchildren, the Ninth
Circuit recently declared that Arizona's
educational tax credit program is
unconstitutional. On May 20, the Supreme
Court can correct the Ninth Circuit [in
Arizona Christian School Tuition
Organization v. Winn, 09-987, and Garriott
v. Winn, 09-991], and there are compelling
reasons for it to do so.
Phoenix resident Glenn Dennard is an inner-
city pastor and father. He and his wife,
Rhonda, used to make a long drive each day
to save their oldest daughter from the failing
school district they lived in. Yet, they were
still not satisfied. Through the Arizona tax
credit program, they secured scholarships
that ensured access to a quality,
individualized education for each of their
five children. If the Supreme Court does not
intervene in this case, however, the Dennard
family may be forced to move in order to
find a better education for their children.
The Establishment Clause requires
government to stay neutral with regard to
religion, meaning it cannot pass laws that
prefer one religion over another, or religion
over nonreligion, or, as the American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU) advocates,
nonreligion over religion. The ACLU is
challenging Arizona's tax credit because it
allows taxpayers to claim a dollar-for-dollar
tax credit for donations to scholarship-
granting charities, including religiously
affiliated organizations. These charities,
known as School Tuition Organizations
(STOs), give scholarships to families to send
their children to the private school of their
choice.
But the tax credit is entirely religiously
neutral; it neither favors nor discriminates
against people who select religious school
options. Private actors-not government
bureaucrats--decide which charities receive
donations to fund the private school
scholarships. As Judge Diarmuid
O'Scannlain said in a powerful dissent to the
Ninth Circuit's decision, the government is
at least four steps removed from these
charities. A private citizen must first create
an STO, and then they must decide whether
to provide scholarships to religious schools.
This is followed by the taxpayer's decision
to donate to that STO. Finally, a parent must
then decide to apply for a scholarship for
their child. Four separate choices by three
private citizens do not equal government
action.
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit decision is in
direct conflict with an Arizona Supreme
Court decision upholding the program under
the Establishment Clause. The Arizona
Supreme Court found that the program aided
a "broad spectrum of citizens" and that it
"allow[ed] a wide range of private choices."
Indeed, there are 55 such STOs, at least 30
of which have no obvious religious
affiliation.
Arizona leads the nation in offering
educational choices to families. The overall
breadth of choice is an important factor that
the U.S. Supreme Court should look at in
determining whether the program being
challenged coerces parents to choose
religious schools. Arizona has more than 10
percent of the nation's charter schools, in
addition to magnet schools, homeschooling
and an open-enrollment policy.
Finally, should the Ninth Circuit's decision
stand, a cloud of uncertainty would be cast
over similar tax credit programs in other
states. The decision could jeopardize
thousands of scholarships, forcing children
nationwide out of their current private
schools.
Already-full public schools could be forced
to enroll thousands of new students in the
next few years, further burdening an already
weakened system. Children who are
succeeding in their current schools could be
uprooted and their educational futures
placed in jeopardy.
The Supreme Court should reverse the Ninth
Circuit's decision so parents can rest assured
their children's educational future is secure.
After all, the Supreme Court has already
ruled parents, not politicians, know what is
best for their own children. The Ninth
Circuit's decision to strike down Arizona's
school voucher program has harmed the
most vulnerable (in this case, Arizona
school kids). The Supreme Court once again
can step in and come to the aid of thousands
of parents who want to provide a better
education for their children.
Eric Robinson is a law clerk at the Institute
for Justice, which is defending Arizona's
tuition tax credit program.
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"A No-Decision in Tuition Tax Credit Case"
SCOTUSblog
August 20, 2010
Lyle Denniston
A group of Arizona taxpayers, in a new
filing in the Supreme Court, has suggested
that the Justices consider avoiding a ruling
in a major case on tuition tax credits for
parents of parochial school students, at least
until the impact of a new Arizona state law
has been assessed, first by lower courts. The
Court in May granted review of two cases;
that was before it was told about new
legislation in the state. The supporters of
the tax credit program presumably will get a
chance to respond before the Court takes
any action on the new development.
The Court has not yet scheduled oral
argument in the consolidated cases (Arizona
Christian School Tuition Organization v.
Winn, 09-987, and Garriott v. Winn, 09-
991). These are appeals by state officials (in
09-991) and by a private tuition scholarship
program in the state, seeking to scuttle the
constitutional challenge to the program, first
enacted in 1997. (Briefing on the merits has
not yet been completed. All of the filings so
far in the case are available on ScotusWiki..
Under the Arizona program, individual
taxpayers in the state get a dollar-for-dollar
tax credit when they make contributions to
private, non-profit groups known as "school
tuition organizations." Such an organization
provides funds to cover scholarships or
grants to students enrolled in private
schools, up through high school.
Contributions to such organizations have
risen into the tens of millions of dollars.
The new brief, filed in the Supreme Court
on Tuesday, is by the taxpayers who have
challenged the program as a violation of the
Constitution's Establishment Clause, on the
theory that the largest tuition organizations
in the state had restricted their scholarships
or grants to students attending specified
parochial schools only. Supporters of the
program, the challengers' new filing said,
"have maintained, throughout this litigation,
that Arizona's tax-credit program is a
program of private charity that need not
comply with the Establishment Clause.
Arizona's new legislation demonstrates
conclusively that the program is not a
program of private charity, but rather a
governmental spending program that uses
[school tuition organizations] as the state's
surrogates to distribute government tax
revenues for the government's educational
purposes."
The brief noted that the supporters had
mentioned the new law in footnotes in their
briefs on the merits and had argued that they
were not relevant to this case. But, the brief
of the challengers argued, the changes bear
directly on the issues in the case. Neither
lower court in ruling in the case had a
chance to assess the impact of the new
legislative changes, the brief said.
After cataloging the changes, the brief
suggested that the Court might wish to
consider sending the case back to lower
courts "for further proceedings that would
take account of the extensive statutory
changes" after the lower courts had ruled.
